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ABSTRACT
This author provides an overview of command and control (C2) in "common
defence." The approach is to show the linkage between the American people and the
operational performance of the U.S. military during combat. The Preamble to the
Constitution and the basic definition of C2 stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
Publication 1 are used as the start point for the thesis. From this start point, a tracing
of C2 in "common defence" is conducted. The focus is based on seven distinct levels
of C2 in "common defence." These levels are hierarchical with a two-way vertical and
horizontal flow of information. Low/high context and external transference are used
to describe and trace the flow of C2 in "common defence" through the hierarchical
levels. The author documents the actual means of decision making, planning, directing,






A. WHY SHOULD WE STUDY C2 OVER THE MILITARY ROLE IN
"COMMON DEFENCE?" 1
B. "COMMON DEFENCE" 2
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) 6
n. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN C2 13
A. INTRODUCTION 13
B. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S C2 OVER THE STRUCTURE AND
OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT 13
1. Perception in Common Sense 13
2. Perception in Other Important Historical Documents 15
a. Perception in the Declaration of Independence 15
b. The Preamble to the Constitution 16
c. The Gettysburg Address 17
d. Summary of the Role Played by Historical Documents .... 17
C. THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON C2 18
D. THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN C2 20
1. The American People Performing Silent C2 21
2. The American People Performing Active C2 22
3. Historical Look at American People Exercising Silent or Active
C2 23
IV
m. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 30
A. INTRODUCTION 30
B. THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM IN C2 33
C. SEPARATION OF POWER ROLE IN C2 34
D. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 37
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 38
A. INTRODUCTION 38
B. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN C2 41
1. Information System 41
2. The Organization and Policy Setting Function 43
3. The Budgetary- Control Function 45
4. Approving Authority Function 48
5. The Declarative Function 49
6. Congressional Oversight 50
C. THE EXECUTIVE'S ROLE IN C2 53
1. The National Mandate 55
2. Defining National Interest 55
3. The President's Legislative Role in C2 61
4. Powers Delegated to the President by Congress 62
5. Leadership/Management Strategy 64
a. Use of Appointment Authority 64
b. Delegation of Authority 66
c. Ability to Integrate and Coordinate 67
d. Ability to Communicate 68
6. President's Role in Setting C2 Aspect of National Security
Policy 69
D. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 72
V. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE, POLICY, AND STRATEGY 73
A. INTRODUCTION 73
B. THE ENVIRONMENT 75
1. The Inheritance 76
2. Communist Ideology is Aggressive 78
3. The Spectrum of Warfare 79
C. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL 80
1. National Security Council 80
2. The CIA 81
3. Department of State 83
4. The Department of Defense (DOD) 83
5. The United States Arm Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) 83
D. THE PROCESS OF SETTING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES.
POLICIES, AND STRATEGIES 84
VI
E. UTILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY .... 86
1. National Security Strategy Provides a Framework for the
President 86
2. Congress 86
3. Department of Defense 89
F. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES,
POLICY AND STRATEGY IN C2 89
1. Nuclear Warfare 90
2. Low-intensity Conflict 90
3. Conventional Warfare 91
VI. FORCE ORGANIZATION 92
A. INTRODUCTION 92
B. The Staff Support 96
1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 96
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 101
a. Function of Joint Chiefs of Staff 101
b. Organization 103
c. Effectiveness of the JCS 104
3. DOD Agencies and DOD Field Activities 106
a. DOD Agencies 107
b. DOD Field Activities 108
C. LINES OF COMMAND 108
vn
1. The Departments 109
a. The Department of the Army 109
b. The Department of the Navy 109
c. The Department of the Air Force 109
2. Unified and Specified Command 110
3. Line of Command Relationship Between the Departments and
Combatant Commanders 113
D. THE INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEMS WITHIN THE DOD .... 114
1. PPBS 114
a. The Planning Phase 115
b. Programming Phase 116
c. The Budgeting Phase 117
2. The JSPS 118
3. JOPS 119
4. The Defense Acquisition System 120
5. Information Systems 121
a. Information Requirements and Joint Reporting Structure . . 122
b. The Staff 124
c. The Communication Systems 124
d. The Automation Systems 126
E. FUNCTIONALITY OF THIS LEVEL IN C2 126
VII. COMBAT READINESS 128
vin
A. INTRODUCTION 128
B. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF COMBAT READINESS 128
C. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT 132
D. TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION 134
1. Technical Training of Individuals and Small Weapon Systems
Team 134
2. Training of Tactical Forces 136
3. Training of Strategic Forces 136
4. Indoctrination 137
E. SUSTAINABILITY 138
F. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 139
G. EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCE'S COMBAT
READINESS 140
1. Self-Evaluation of Combat Readiness 140
2. Inspections, Evaluation, and Command Visits 140
VID. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 142
A. INTRODUCTION 142
B. THE CREATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ... 142
1. Political/Ideological Constraints 144
2. Economic Constraints 145
3. Technology Constraints 146
4. Diplomatic Constraints 146
IX
5. Geographical Constraints 146
6. Military Power Constraints 147
C. THE COMMANDER'S PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD . 147
1. The Mission 150
2. Intelligence 152




D. THE COMMANDER'S CONTROL AND FEEDBACK LOOP .... 157
1. U.S. Military Code of Ethics 159
2. The Staff 160
3. The Communication System 161
4. The Automation System 163
5. The Leadership Ability of the Commander 166
E. THE EVOLVEMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 166
IX. THE CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 168
A. SUMMARY 168
B. THE CONCLUSION 170
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 172
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The Williams Model for C2 9
Figure 2. Level 1 of the Williams Model for C2 14
Figure 3. Level 2 of the Williams Model for C2 31
Figure 4. Level 3 of the Williams Model for C2 39
Figure 5. The National Interest Matrix 59
Figure 6. Local View of Issue 59
Figure 7. Regional View of Issue 60
Figure 8. International View of Issue 60
Figure 9. Level 4 of the Williams Model for C2 74
Figure 10. Level 5 of the Williams Model for C2 93
Figure 11. Organization for "Common Defence." 94
Figure 12. Possible Performance Requirement for Communications System 125
Figure 13. Level Six of the Williams Model for C2 129
Figure 14. Level 7 of the Williams Model for C2 143




A. WHY SHOULD WE STUDY C2 OVER THE MILITARY ROLE IN
"COMMON DEFENCE?"
Providing for "Common Defence" is much like playing sports, but much more
complex, difficult, unpredictable, and expensive. The University of Notre Dame does
not play football with its basketball team or place its basketball coach in charge of the
football team. The decision on the starting line up for either team at Notre Dame is
not made by the Trustees or President but rather by the Coach who is intimately aware
of the capabilities and limitations of his players. Yet, the coaches at Notre Dame are
stringently held accountable for the performance of the teams. When the people of the
United States (U.S.) "provide for the Common Defence", they prepare themselves for
future events which may challenge the existence of the nation. Unlike football, the
rules, time, place, participants, impact, and nature of this challenge are unknown. This
paper is a description of the U.S. system in place today whose objective is to prepare
the nation for this challenge. It is a system which is justifiably (?) consuming over
six percent of the Gross National Product and impacting the survival of the U.S.
What is your role in the system for "common defense?"
The objective of this thesis is to establish a framework by which the American
people and the military can realistically understand Command and Control (C2) over
the military role in "Common Defence" for the following reasons:
• The ability to effectively have C2 over the American people's effort to
accomplish the mission of "common defence" is vital to the preservation of
the United States of America.
• Time, distance, weapons destructiveness and accuracy, and recoverability or
reconstitution capability have complicated and sensitized C2 in "common
defence."
• Too often, the means or tools for passing or preparing C2 decisions are
confused with the C2 decision to the detriment of combat effectiveness.
• The focus of C2 doctrine is limited to the military operational applications,
whereas it should encompass all elements providing C2 over the military force.
• The submersion of the United States up to its chin in international trade and
multi-national alliances for defense provides potential for controversy.
Is football at Notre Dame more important than the challenge of providing for "common
defence?"
B. "COMMON DEFENCE"
"Common defence" is the action or lack of action taken by the United States'
citizenry and Government to provide and ensure that other nations or powerful
individuals by coercion do not deny the American people an opportunity for the
accomplishment of the objectives stated in the Preamble. "Common defence" is an
inherent interest and responsibility of every citizen whether fostered or not.
The Mayflower Compact signed in 1621 serves as the first documented action of
a group in the land known as the United States to provide for "common defence." The
signers of the Mayflower Compact found a rallying point in their commonality of
interest.
A key passage of the Mayflower Compact reads as follows:
Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually in the Presence of God and one
another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for
our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furthermore of the Ends aforesaid; and
by Virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal Laws,
Ordinances. Acts, Constitutions, and Offices, from time to time, as shall be
thought most meet and convenient for the general Good of the Colony; unto
which we promise all due submission and Obedience. [Ref. 1]
Their power and strength rested in their willingness to work together for "the general
good of the colony." The basic agreements of the Mayflower Compact were made in
order to enhance their opportunity for survival. The Mayflower Compact was voided
in 1691 when "the colony was absorbed by the Massachusetts Bay Colony." The
significance of the Mayflower Compact is the ideology behind the willingness of the
signatories to subject themselves to "just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts,
Constitutions, and Offices ... for the general Good of the Colony..." The ideology
present is based on the Judeo-Christian belief in vesting "religious authority in the
congregation." Adapting this belief to their situation, the Pilgrims set forth an ideology
for "Government by the people and for the people."
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America. [Ref. 2]
Interestingly, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States cites six
objectives for governance. "Common defence" is one of these objectives, but it is
not in any context given a higher priority than the other five objectives. "Common
defence" and the other five objectives for establishing the Constitution of the United
States must reinforce and support each other. There is a dependency relationship so
strong that failure in one objective may easily cause failure in the other five
objectives.
Professor Frank Teti at the Naval Postgraduate School in his class on National
Security Affairs describes the responsibility of the US Government for national security
as the Janus Effect. The Greek God, Janus, in accordance with Encyclopedia
Americana:
was worshipped under 2 aspects: as the God of all places of passage and as the
spirit of all beginnings. In the former capacity he was believed to protect all
gates and arches in Rome, many of which were consecrated to him and bore his
image of two bearded faces looking in opposite direction. [Ref. 3]
The Janus concept utilizes the concept of the two faces on the same body looking
internally as well as externally to protect Rome. By the same token, "common
defence" is an internal and external focus by the citizens of the United States to ensure
opportunities for posterity, justice, "domestic tranquility", "common defence", "blessing
of liberty", "more perfect Union", and "general welfare."
The seed of "common defence" is strong and well documented in the Declaration
of Independence and the Preamble. "Common defence" is nourished by the heritage
and values of America; its root is the will of the individual citizen; its trunk is the
people's will and the nation's economic and technological power; and its branches are
the bodies of the Government. This tree analogy provides an insightful look at
"common defence." The relationship of the parts of a tree to the tree accurately
portrays the interworkings of key elements in the American society. The heritage and
values of the American people, the will of the individual citizen, the people's will and
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ideology, the nation's economic and technological power, and the functional branches
of Government have worked together for the nation's prosperity.
In this age of high technology, world ending military power capability, bountiful
wealth and luxury, and high-stakes diplomacy (such as the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty, membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc.), it is tempting to
ignore the elements of our society which have been vital to the "common defence" of
the United States. Admittedly, the "common defence" of the United States is a
controversial topic with advocates for many different strategies and national security
policies.
In the author's opinion, the "common defence" of the United States has been a
success for the following reasons:
• The strong ideological and moral values exhibited by the early American
colonist provided a strong foundation for the birth of a nation.
• The proud heritage of the United States and continuous growth of sound
democratic ideology and practices inspired loyalty and responsible citizenry
among the citizens of the United States.
• The abundance and/or availability of resources, successful technological and
economic development, ample time to build-up during crisis, relatively weak
neighbors, almost insurmountable distance from relatively strong countries, and
the people's willingness as a body to uphold democratic ideology permitted the
survival and growth of the United States.
• The balance of power between the branches of Government and the overall
mature leadership (although there were instances of immature leadership) in
each body guided the growth of the United States and promoted the common
good.
Therefore, "common defence" includes some aspects of domestic policy and all
aspects of foreign policy. The five elements used by the American people to provide
for "common defence" are:
Ideology;
Intelligence;
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy;
Military Defense Policy; and
Technological and Economic Power.
These elements have interdependencies which are inseparable. This paper pertains to
C2 over the military role in "common defence", therefore the orientation or focus is
on military defense. However, the other four elements will not be ignored due to
their direct influence on military defense and their involvement in the same decision
making process as military defense. [Ref. 4, pp. 16-17]
Concentration on high technology, military power, diplomacy, and personal and
national wealth is potential catastrophe for "common defence" because such
concentration causes an imbalance between the sources of our strength as a nation
working against or working with other nations. The source of strength in the United
States has always been the American people through expressions of their will, values,
and sense of heritage. The result of the American people's effort has been high
technology, military power, diplomacy, and personal and national wealth. Focusing the
resources of the nation too heavily on the end product may stunt the will, values, and
sense of heritage of the American people.
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
C2 is a very confusing term to personnel inside and outside of the Department
of Defense (DOD). JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, defines C2 as follows:
Command and Control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of
the mission.
Command and Control System consists of the facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions
assigned. [Ref. 5, p. 77]
Noticeably, JCS PUB 1 does not define Command, Control, and Communication (C3)
or Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). However, the
confusion over C2, C3I, and C3 stems from the different connotations of the individual
words from what we have accepted as the phrases' meaning.
In this paper, C2 is defined as the orchestration of the military role in "common
defence." Due to the uncertainties surrounding future conflict, C2 elements are an
evolving group. C2 involves rational, logical, and emotional processes. The logical
process is the use of analytical assessment in order to formulate policy, plans, and
operations. The emotional process is the guidance of policy, plans, and operations by
will, values, and sense of heritage. The rational process is reasoning between the
logical and the emotional.
In recognition of the communications systems and associated discipline areas
contribution to the orchestration of war, the phrase C3 evolved. In recognition of the
communications and intelligence communities and the associated industrial support
contributions to the orchestration of war, the phrase C3I evolved. Throughout history,
technological developments have made C2 over warfare extremely complex and
difficult. For example, the range of weapons during the stone age was as far as a
person could throw the stone but the range on nuclear weapons is several thousand
miles. The leader of the stone age warriors orchestrated the fight at close range
whereas the leader today may fight at close range or extremely long distance.
Having brought out the above point, this paper uses the Williams Model (see
Figure 1) to present a clear view of C2, C3, and C3I.
The Williams Model presents C2 in "common defence" as having seven
hierarchical levels of actuality. The foundation or lowest level (Level One) in the
hierarchy for C2 in "common defence" is the American people through expressions
of their will, values, heritage, and economic potential toward "common defence." The
remaining levels in the hierarchy for C2 in "common defence" in the order from lowest
to highest are:
• Level Two - The Constitution of the United States.
• Level Three - The three branches of the Federal Government who expound
their power in the form of Congressional Laws, Judicial Rulings, and
Executive Orders.
• Level Four - The National Security Objectives, Policy, and Strategy.
• Level Five - The Military Force Organization.
• Level Six - The Combat Readiness of the Military Force.
• Level Seven - The Operational Performance.
The numerical count for a level has an inverse relation with the level in the hierarchy.
The model uses an inverse relation because there is a pyramid-like structural
relationship between higher and lower levels. The levels with the higher count in the
model are derived from the levels with the lower count. The derivation of the higher
level can be traced to low and high context activity in the lower levels or extension
transference of the lower levels.
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Figure 1. The Williams Model for C2
The "common defence" of the United States depends upon the mature
development of each C2 level. The concept of the model requires each level to be
fully functional during peace and war time. The moment of transition from peace to
war is unpredictable and the unpreparedness or poor development of a C2 level could
mean the annihilation of the United States in a matter of hours, weeks, or months.
Up to World War n, the United States could feel secure because of time and
space. The Atlantic and Pacific Ocean along with friendly/weak neighbors at our
borders offered time and space for "common defence". The ability of our potential
adversaries to quickly deliver a destructive force onto the shores of the United States
has reduced to a negligible amount the security provided by time and space. The
surprise attack at Pearl Harbor forced the realization that the security of time and space
has passed and brought the end to isolationism.
The destruction suffered at the hand of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor is a speck
in one's eye compared to the potential destructiveness of a successful surprise attack
in this day and age. As a matter of fact, the ability of potential attackers to quickly
deliver unacceptable damage remains even if the attack is not a surprise. In Sir John
Hackett's book, The Third World War 1985 , or Tom Clancy's book, Red Storm Rising
,
the assertions of modem weapons destructiveness are valid, although presented in an
imagined plot. Again, time and distance are not a factor which we can count on in
order to reduce the level of preparedness for military forces. The force projection
capability of the United States and her potential enemies have reduced time and
distance to a minuscule factor in the security/national defense of our country. Actually,
the plot in Hackett and Clancy's novels was conservative in their portrayal of the
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current threat to national defense. The objective in making such comments as those
above is not to scare, but to reinforce the importance of the mature development of the
C2 levels. The Williams Model captures the requirement for the mature development
of the levels through the pyramid structure.
There are numerous C2 models which tend to focus on the battle management
or operational process, but with the Williams Model credit is given to the countless
activities happening before operational performance or combat which are part of C2.
It is unrealistic to limit military C2 to activities that occur during battle. The
directions or decisions being decided by American people, Congress, the President, and
Secretary of Defense in our peacetime environment directly, influences — sometimes,
determines — and always, limits the combatant commander's decisions and decision
making capability during battle.
Many authors on military sociology in their writings and teachings have indirectly
discussed C2 over the military in "common defence" issues while explaining the civil-
military relationship. In actuality, these discussions on the civil -military relationship
have applicability to the Williams Model first four levels of C2 in "common defence."
Writings by National Security experts on national interest, national security, and
national security policy also pertain to the first four levels of the Williams Model for
C2 over the military role in "common defence."
By the same token, level five and six contributions to C2 in "common defence"
is covered under doctrine, readiness, systems acquisition, training programs, and etc.
There is not a void of information about the contribution of each of these levels
to "common defence" but we tend not to think of the first six levels in terms of C2.
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Why? This question has no clear answer. This paper addresses why we should think
of the first six levels in terms of C2.
The JCS Pub I limits the focus of C2 to a "properly designated commander over
assigned forces", but the act of designating is an "exercise of authority and direction"
stemming from the American people. The highest designated commander in the United
States is the Commander-in-Chief, the President. To limit our study of C2 to the
President downward ignores the influence on "common defence"/national security of the
American people, the Constitution. Congress, and the Judicial System. And above all,
the American people designate the President. The Williams' model captures the flow
of C2 from the power source or the highest appeal authority to the mission execution.
The JCS Pub I focuses on "the commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of the mission", but the mission belongs ultimately to the American
People. The Williams model reflects the origin and total execution of the mission for
"common defence" in the United States.
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II. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN C2
A. INTRODUCTION
Level one of the Williams Model shows the American people via the expression
of their will, values, sense of heritage, and economic strength as the foundation and
ultimate source of C2 over the military role in "common defence" (See Figure 2-1).
Natural law and the Constitution to the United States protect the rights of the American
people. This protection provides an environment whereby the people may exercise C2
over the government. This chapter develops and shows the role of the American
people in C2.
B. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S C2 OVER THE STRUCTURE AND
OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT
An elementary look at the United States heritage shows that the American people
through expressions of their will, values, and economic strength determine the structure
and objectives of the government. In determining the structure and objectives of the
government, the American people directly influence the military role in "common
defence."
1. Perception in Common Sense
In the pamphlet, Common Sense , Thomas Paine stated:
Some convenient tree will afford them a State House, under the branches of
which the whole Colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is
more than probable that their first laws will have the title only of Regulations
and be enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem. In this first
parliament every man by natural right will have a seat.
13
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Figure 2. Level 1 of the Williams Model for C2
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But as the colony encreases, the public concerns will encrease likewise, and
the distance at which the members may be separated, will render it too
inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occasion as at first, when their
number was small, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling.
This will point out the convenience of their consenting to leave legislative part
to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are
supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed
them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were
they present. If the colony continue encreasing, it will become necessary to
augment the number of representatives, and that the interest of every part of the
colony may be attended to, it will be found best to divide the whole into
convenient parts, each part sending its proper number: and that the elected might
never form to themselves an interest separate from the electors, prudence will
point out the propriety of having elections often: because as the elected might by
means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few
months, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflection of
not making a rod for themselves. [Ref. 6, p. 47-48]
In the passage, Thomas Paine explains that Government exists and operates under the
consent of and as a convenience to the people.
2. Perception in Other Important Historical Documents
There are many important historical documents that provide testimony to
the strength and resolve of the American people to determine the structure and
objective of the government. Three such documents are the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, and the Gettysburg
Address.
a. Perception in the Declaration of Independence
The Declaration of Independence states and justifies the American
Colonies intent "to dissolve the political bands" between themselves and the British
Crown. A key passage of the Declaration of Independence reads as follows:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. -That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
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consent of the governed, -That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destnictive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness. [Ref. 7, p. 1]
These passages like many other passages of the Declaration of Independence show
soundly that the power of the United States comes clearly from the people or the
governed. A willingness to give life, wealth, and a spiritual drive for "Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Happiness" are profoundly expressed in the undertones of this
document. In the Revolutionary War, the American people exercised their "inalienable
right" and demonstrated their power and endurance. As the source of power for the
government and possessor of a willingness to defend their power, the American people
have C2.
b. The Preamble to the Constitution
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States asserts a
recognition by the Founding Fathers that the people "do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." The first attempt by the colonist to
formulate a government was under the Articles of Confederation from March 1781
till the inauguration of the constitutional government in March 1789. Under the
Articles of Confederation, a union was created of the 13 sovereign states, but there
was noted weaknesses in the union and the confederation government's ability to
"establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."
The Confederation government lacked the authority to overcome the perceived
weaknesses. Through an on-going public debate from the signing of the proposed
16
Constitution of the United States on September 17, 1787 till the final state ratification
by Rhode Island on May 29, 1790, the American people decided to set aside the
Confederation government for the constitutional government. The drafting and
ratification of the Constitution by the American people is an outstanding exercise of
C2. The Preamble's citing of "common defence" as an objective for governance
confirms it as part of the will and values of the American people. The drafting and
signing of the Constitution of the United States was the second illustration of the
American people exercising C2.
c. The Gettysburg Address
In the conclusion of the Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln stated:
...It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,
that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which
they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these
dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new
birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the
people shall not perish from the earth. [Ref. 8]
In honoring the dead at the Battle of Gettysburg, President Lincoln declared the Civil
War as a test of whether a Government receiving power from the people can withstand
the test of time. Again, the American people manifested their C2.
d. Summary of the Role Played by Historical Documents
Although only three historical documents were quoted, there are many
other cherished documents which set forth the inner fire which bestows the will, values,
heritage, and economic strength of the American people as the ultimate source of C2.
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C. THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON C2
Parents, the educational system of the United States, the business community,
historical publications, institutional systems, such as Holidays, the flags, the Church,
and etc., teach the meaning, presence, and importance of the American people's will,
values, and economic strength to the power and vitality of the nation. These
mechanisms which are institutionalized and deeply rooted in our culture contribute
immensely to C2. In the book, Beyond Culture, Edward T. Hall writes:
Culture is man's medium; there is not one aspect of human life that is not
touched and altered by culture. This means personality, how people express
themselves (including shows of emotion), the way they think, how they move,
how problems are solved, how their cities are planned and laid out, how
transportation systems function and are organized, as well as how economic and
government systems are put together and function. [Ref. 9, p. 16]
The willingness of young men in the prime of life to give their life for "duty, honor,
and country" is well accepted in the United States. Why? The American people feel
good about their culture and have the strength and resolve to preserve their ideology.
The abundance of natural resources and resourceful people earned for the United
States economic advantages over other countries. The United States promised hope,
liberty, and fruitful rewards to hard and smart workers. As a result, the nation
attracted many quality people during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries. These quality people converted the United States from a
wilderness to a first rate economic, technological, and military power in the twentieth
century. The United States' economic and technological strength paid high returns for
the Allied forces during World War I and II.
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A pertinent question is whether the demands of our culture will exceed the
available supply of resources? And if the demand exceeds the available supply, can
our society make the necessary quality of living adjustments to cope with the situation
and still maintain our strong ideology? Currently, the United States depends upon
foreign sources for several strategic resources/minerals. The cut-off of these supplies
will place the United States in an awkward situation. The American people will
determine the success of policy during a cut-off. The American people, industry, and
military are far behind in preparing themselves for the implications of resource
shortages or cutoff. Many politicians know the implications of a resource shortages;
are formulating positions on possible courses of action; but consider the topic too
politically sensitive to address. The American people need to know the facts of how
the United States plans to resolve resource shortages, so they can wholeheartedly
support the choices made by their elected officials. Successful investment in Research
and Development can potentially solve the dependency problem but the lead time is
tremendous.
Furthermore, can our society continue to withstand the drain on resources brought
about by containment policy? With the US military and intelligence personnel spread
around the world, there is a serious external flow of resources into other countries.
The external flow of resources means that the dollars are not circulating within the
United States for additional growth. Growth of the San Diego and San Antonio area
and industrial buildup in Massachusetts and California are classic examples of economic
gains received from the circulation of military expenditures. The turnover of funds
spent by the government contribute immensely to economic growth. This economic
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growth creates an increase in corporate and personal revenues which directly elevates
the nation's tax base.
The technological and industrial base of the United States has loss some of its
competitive edge. In some industries, the decline in market share is very drastic.
Many American corporations in order to reduce corporate cost have transferred their
production plants to foreign countries because of cheaper labor cost and other cost
effective reasons. The American people must take a stand and maintain the
competitive edge of the United States technology and industrial base or else lose its
capacity for "common defence."
D. THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN C2
In the book, Civil-Military Relations , Andrew J. Goodpaster wrote:
The military establishment is designed, operated, and supported to serve goals
and interests—in particular, security goals and interests—of the society at large.
This is the fundamental, all-embracing relationship of civil and military in our
democratically governed society, and all that the military is or does should be
aligned to these goals. [Ref. 10, p. 311]
Here, General Goodpaster acknowledges the American people as the source of the
"common defence" mission and the importance of the military being closely aligned
with its source of power. Throughout the history of the United States, the American
people have exercised C2 to maintain close alignment between their goals and interest
and the functioning of the government.
The degree of C2 by the American people is often determined at the emotional
and rational level. At the emotional and rational level, the American people assess
how well the government is fulfilling their goals and interests. The outcome of the
assessment determines the degree of involvement by the American people in C2.
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A natural theme is whether a group acting emotionally and/or rationally can
provide a sound foundation of C2. This theme is traceable to the following:
• Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson's differences in
"images of the public and the origins of American government." [Ref. 11, pp.
139-234]
• The existence of conservative military realism in a liberal American society.
[Ref. 12, pp. 5-27]
Interestingly, these themes are still debatable items today. They concern the soundness
of the people's emotional and rational view of "common defence." The people's
emotional and rational view of "common defence" have strengthen the nation.
1. The American People Performing Silent C2
The American people have a strong rational propensity to depend upon the
government to guide the course of the United States toward its objectives. They
recognized that expert analysis of options and timely decisions were paramount to the
future security and prosperity of the nation. The rational propensity took the decision
making responsibility and authority over policies, plans, and operations from the
American people as a group. It passed responsibility to the talented elements of the
population who the people judged best capable to determine the future direction of the
nation.
The following comments by Calvin Coolidge in his 1923 Memorial Day
Address explains the emotional element of the American people's dependence on
government:
...The authority of law here is not something which is imposed upon the people;
it is the will of the people themselves. The decision of the court here is not
something which is apart from the people; it is the judgment of the people
themselves. The right of the ownership of property here is not something
withheld from the people; it is the privilege of the people themselves. Their
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sovereignty is absolute and complete. A definition of the relationship between
the institutions of our government and the American people entirely justifies the
assertion that: "all things were made by them; and without them was not anything
made that was made." It is because the American government is the sole
creation and possession of the people that they have always cherished it and
defended it, and always will. . . . [Ref. 13]
On the emotional level, a good faith element of the C2 process enables the American
people to rely on the Government to be logical and rational. The American people
express their goals and interest for "common defence" in very broad terms which
generally directs the long term evolvement of "common defence." Then, the people
depend on the government to develop these broad goals and interest into detailed
policy, plans, and operations for "common defence" as well as the other objectives for
governance. Therefore, duly elected or appointed government officials regulate,
execute, and judge the activities of the United States. Yet, the American people
maintain C2 by holding the government officials accountable for the objectives of
governance.
2. The American People Performing Active C2
Recognizing the impact of Governmental decisions, the American people
have a recourse for direct communication of their opinions to the government in order
to influence C2 and change the course of policy. In the book, Civil -Military Relations
,
Samuel P. Huntington develops that the American people tend to constrain the level
and use of military force. By constraining the level and use of military force, the
American people influence and direct the accomplishment of the "common defence"
objective. [Ref. 12, pp. 17-22]
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To sway certain decisions by the government concerning the military, the
American people use various techniques to surface indicators of potential favorable or
unfavorable political consequences for each alternative. In the author's opinion, the
people use the following techniques to exercise C2 over the Government:
The electoral vote;
Feedback networks to the Government's military, civil servant employees or
elected officials;
Freedom of the press;
Financial and Technological Support;
Public protest;
Responsible citizenry as indicated by all volunteer military force and quality
of public servants;
Succession;
Active lobby and special interest groups;
Exercise of the Judicial system by individuals or groups; and
Others.
Historically, the American people have used a mixture of these techniques to exercise
their C2 over the government. The responsiveness of the government to each of these
techniques varies in accordance with the merits of the position expounded and the
perceived magnitude of the public opinion.
3. Historical Look at American People Exercising Silent or Active C2.
Through World War II, Huntington's constraint idea was accurate in scope.
Prior to World War II, the American people were comfortable with the very broad
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direction and guidance of the Constitution of the United States for the provision of
"common defence" except for the Civil War.
Whenever a perception of "common defence" being threaten was raised, such
as during the Indian Wars of the late nineteenth century and the Poncho Villa Raids
across the Rio Grande, the American people surfaced feedback to Congress or the
resident requesting appropriate actions by the United States. Through the feedback
system, the people directed the military role in "common defence."
In the book, Commander-in-Chief by Eric Larabee, the deliberations of
President Roosevelt and his staff over whether to enter World War II were discussed
from 1938 to 1941. Personally, President Roosevelt favored entering the war earlier
than 1941 but, his presidential decision was not to enter because of strong public
sentiment toward isolationism. The President cited the political destruction of President
Woodrow Wilson after World War I when he attempted to involve the United States
in the League of Nations without having public support. Mr. Larabee explains that
President Roosevelt's action during 1938 to 1941 was everything short of going to
war. [Ref. 14, pp. 40-96]
In the book, Politics and Government in the United States , by Emmette S.
Redford, David B. Truman, Alan F. Westin, and Robert C. Wood, a discussion is
made about the Quarantine Speech in which President Roosevelt stated:
It seems unfortunately true that the epidemics of world lawlessness is spreading.
When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves
and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the
community against the spread of the disease.
The authors of Politics and Government in the United States stated:
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The public and press reaction to this "Quarantine Speech" was so negative,
however, that Roosevelt was forced to proceed with great caution in preparing
America, morally and physically, to engage Germany and Japan. Even the fall
of France to Hitler's blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940 did not bring domestic
opinion around to accepting the necessity of involvement. Roosevelt felt
compelled to declare in a campaign speech in Boston in October of 1940, "I
shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into
any foreign wars." Great Britain was to be shored up by "all aid short of war."
Congress did accept the nation's first peacetime draft in 1940; and after three
months of agonizing politicking, the Lend-Lease program was approved early in
1941. [Ref. 15, p. 712]
After his election in 1940, President Roosevelt appointed the hawkish Henry
Stimson as Secretary of War. Secretary Stimson interpreted his appointment as a
mandate for the inevitability of war and commenced a campaign for war within the
administration staff. Even with the insistence of Secretary Stimson for the United
States to go to war, President Roosevelt still refused to request a declaration of war
from Congress. [Ref. 14, pp. 45-46]
The President waited till the bombing of Pearl Harbor before requesting a
declaration of war against Japan. The request for declaration of war against Germany
and Italy came six days later after Germany and Italy first declared war against the
United States. In President Roosevelt's actions, we can plainly see the will, value, and
heritage of the American people providing C2 over the military role in "common
defence." In both instances where the request was made for a declaration of war, the
President had the clear backing of the American people. In subjecting his will to the
will of the American people, President Roosevelt demonstrated the American people's
effectiveness at providing C2 over the military. The government's C2 over the military
role in "common defense" was continuously well aligned with the consensus view
through World War II.
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After World War II, the American people through their international trade
arrangements, cultural habits, and support of containment policy have dictated the vast
growth in the mission and scope of "common defence." Unfortunately, many citizens
and government officials in the United States fail to understand, communicate, and/or
recognize this linkage of the American people to C2.
The American people's C2 over the military role in "common defence"
came to the forefront and the scope of Huntington's constraint idea needed expanding.
In the author's opinion, the American people became more active participants in C2
for the following reasons:
• The improvements in automation and communication technology have enabled
the television, newspaper, and literary society to provide the American people
with information pertaining to "common defence" issues on an almost real-
time basis. Having available the information to make evaluations on the
merits of the government's performance in the area of "common defence."
• The Communist Threat, early military attitude toward the potential destruction
of the world by Nuclear Weapons, political sensitivity of low intensity conflict,
the large military expenditures, and reports of fraud, waste, and abuse aroused
deep concerns.
The increased involvement of the American people has obtained and is obtaining mixed
results.
The Government's C2 over the military role in "common defence" is prone
for controversy, if not well aligned with the consensus view. Many authors narrowly
view the Vietnam War as a demonstration of the inability of a democratic nation to
successfully wage a long war without the support of public opinion. This view
overlooks the C2 issue of whether the American people saw the United States
involvement in the Vietnam War as destructive to the objective of governance.
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In the Constitution of the United States, the American people delegated to
Congress the authority to declare war. Traditionally, the President of the United States
has initiated the declaration of war through a formal request to Congress for approval.
In the case of the Vietnam War, the President did not request a declaration of war.
Congress gave instead the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 which said the president
may "take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force" to help any nation
requesting aid "in defense of its freedom" under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty and authorized the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack" against US armed forces. [Ref. 16, p. 717] With the power given President
Johnson, he was perfectly legal in committing US forces in Vietnam.
Therefore, the C2 issue lies between the government and the American people.
Even when the government has consented to the use of the armed forces, the American
people must still decide whether the government acted within the broad objectives for
"common defence." In the book, Military Heritage of America by R. Ernest Dupuy
and Trevor N. Dupuy, the authors state:
Many facets of the Vietnam situation caused disillusionment and confusion among
elements of US citizenry. Increasingly the feeling grew that the United States
was engaged in a war that was none of our business, and which did not in any
way affect the vital interests of the United States. [Ref. 16, p. 726]
As a result, the American people used the electoral vote, feedback networks, public
protest, irresponsible citizenry (draft evasion), exercisement of the judicial system,
freedom of the press, and active lobby to exercise their C2 over the military role in
"common defence" during the Vietnam War period. In 1971, the Congress revoked
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Still, it took President Nixon until 1973 to comply
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with this revocation. When it became apparent in 1975 that South Vietnam would fall,
the Congress refused to provide supplies in order to possibly change the inevitable.
The following words of General Fred C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, US Army,
July 1976 best describe the outcome:
Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American
Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people's Army
in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and
proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed the
American people are committed, when the American people lose their
commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis,
the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an
arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly.
[Ref. 17, p. 7]
The Vietnam War was a classical example of the American people placing constraints
on the use of military force.
The presidential electoral vote is the primary technique used by the American
people for C2 over the military role in "common defence." With the electoral vote,
the American people decide who will be the President/Commander-in-Chief of the
United States. The presidential election in 1968 provides an excellent example of
how the American people used the electoral vote to perform C2 over the military role
in "common defence." By 1968, the Vietnam War had certainly lost the public
support. President Johnson decided not to run for re-election in 1968 because he felt
that public opposition to his Vietnam War policy adversely affected his chances of
winning. By influencing President Johnson's decision, the American people were
exercising C2. President Nixon ran his campaign on the promise to bring "peace with
honor." [Ref. 16, p. 727] The election of President Nixon in 1968 demonstrates an
exercise of C2 over the military role in "common defence" which influenced the
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direction of the Vietnam War. In the election of 1980, President Reagan defeated
President Carter. President Reagan campaigned for strong "common defense." During
war and peace, the designation of the Commander-in-Chief is a vital C2 function
performed by the American people.
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III. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
A. INTRODUCTION.
Level two covers the delegation of responsibility for "common defence" from
the American people to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches by the
Constitution of the United States (See Figure 3-1). The Constitution of the United
States did the following:
established the government, outlined its purposes, limited its scope, indicated the
several branches of that government, and defined the offices of each branch,
saying how they shall be filled and how the authority and power vested in each
shall be related to one another. [Ref. 18, pg. 4]
The Constitution provides an excellent hierarchical delegation of authority over the
military role in "common defence" from the people to the government of the United
States. This level is broad as well.
The Constitution of the United States created the oldest form of government in
existence, today. The Constitution has survived because it is a living document
providing an adequate balance between government stability and flexibility in a
changing world. The provisions of the Constitution have allowed flexibility by way
of amendments to the Constitution or through interpretations of the authority conferred.
Government stability was accomplished by the implementation of some republican
features to the American democracy, such as:
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• The election of the President by electors who are determined by state
legislature specified procedures.
• The requirement for consent and approval by Congress for the Presidential
appointments of personnel to key government positions in the Executive
Departments.
• The procedures for Constitutional Amendments.
Over the years, there have been many discussions concerning the virtues of this
document. Many argue that the Constitution was drafted in order to protect certain
economic interest belonging to the delegates at the Constitutional Convention and
deprive certain people of their liberty. Whereas the Constitution may have omitted or
overlooked certain liberties, the Constitution has expressed procedures for whereby the
oversights may be corrected or changes may be implemented as needed. The
corrections are known as Constitutional Amendments. As to whether the Constitution
was drafted to protect certain economic interests, the fact remains that authoritative
interpretations have protected every citizens economic interests and rights and the
American people have supported the ideas and structure for government implemented
by the Constitution. [Ref. 19]
The Constitution provides for federalism and separation of power. Federalism
provisions divided the power in the United States between the national government,
states, and people. The separation of power provisions vest the national government's
power to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in such a manner that each
may perform checks and balances on the other.
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B. THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM TN C2.
Immediately following the Revolutionary War, the colonist drafted and adopted
the Article of Confederations as the instrument of government. In the book, The
American Republic: Its Government and Politics . Peter H. Odegards states that "the
major weakness of the Confederation, however, was not its lack of powers, but rather
its lack of power to enforce its powers." [Ref. 20, p. 94] The Framers of the
Constitution faced the challenge of appropriately dividing responsibility and authority
between the national government and states. The federal system implemented by the
Constitution of the United States created a framework to meet this challenge.
The Constitution of the United States provided a reinforcement of responsibility
with the authority to accomplish the assigned objectives.
In giving the responsibility and authority for "common defence" to the national
government, the American people took a firm stand toward enhancing the chances of
the United States' survival. In 1787, external and internal threats jeopardized the
security of the American people. England, France, and Spain still advocated
colonialism and posed an external threat to the sovereignty' of the United States.
Internally, the smaller states feared that the larger states would possibly force their
will on them. Under the Confederation government, it was conceivable for the
sovereign states to be divided and conquered. Realizing their commonality of beliefs,
fears, and objectives, the American people united under the Constitution for "common
defence."
The Constitution implements the federal system by granting and restricting the
powers of the states and the branches of the national government.
33
The States were given responsibility for "the appointment of the officers" in the
militia, "and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress" when the militia was not "employed in the service of the United States."
Otherwise, the provisions in the Constitution of the United States passed responsibility
and authority to the national government for "common defence." [Ref. 21]
The Civil War was a strong test of the federalism principle. The Civil War
tested the national governments authority to enforce constitutional laws upon the
individual states. The national government proved strong enough to overcome an
internal threat to the union.
C. SEPARATION OF POWER ROLE IN C2.
On the ability of the Article of Confederation to legislate, execute, and
judicature, Odegards stated:
Except for the Committee of States, it lacked any effective central executive
establishment with its own machinery for the enforcement of the laws of
Congress. All government was, in effect, in commission, with all the weaknesses
that go with rule by committees. The weaknesses of committee government were
compounded under the Articles by the fact that every state had an equal vote,
and most important legislation, and most important administrative acts, required
the consent of nine of the thirteen states. The Confederation had no courts for
this. And, of course, Congress had no power to regulate commerce, to enforce
the validity of contracts, and - most important - no independent power to collect
taxes, [ref. 20, p. 94]
The Constitution of the United States divided the power of the national government
between the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches. Whereas the national
government under the federal system received certain responsibilities and appropriate
authority, the branches of the national government shared responsibilities and authority.
The Constitution instituted a system of checks and balances where each branch
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reviewed the actions of the other for compliance with the Constitution, law, or common
good. The provisions for "common defence" include shared responsibility and
authority; and a system of checks and balances.
The following excerpts from the Constitution granted "common defence" related
powers to the Legislative branch:
Power to try all impeachment;
Power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful arts;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
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Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress; and
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof,
[ref. 21]
Also, the legislature has "Advice and Consent'' authority over all Presidential
appointments and Treaties.
The following excerpts from the Constitution granted "common defence" related
powers to the Executive branch:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President...
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating
to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases
of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
...he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of
the United States. [Ref. 22]
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
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be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become
Law. . . . [Ref. 23]
The following excerpts from the Constitution granted "common defence" related
power to the Judicial branch:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. [Ref. 24]
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting. . . . [Ref. 25]
D. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
As stated earlier, the Constitution provided shared power between the branches
of government and implemented checks and balance by one branch over another
branch's actions. Neither the Executive, Judicial, or Legislative branch has authority
to act, independently. The set-up of the national government fulfills the American
people's desire for the authority over "common defence" to be centrally focused, but
not abused. Together, the three branches have the ways and means for the
orchestration of the American people's effort to accomplish the "common defence"
objective. The Constitution separated law and policy making (including the purse
string) from law and policy execution; and provided independent judgment on conflicts
between the law and its fulfillment. The provisions of checks and balances reduced
the likelihood of abuses and permitted the policing of abuses as they occurred. The
shared power and system of checks and balances cause drawbacks, such as
accountability problems between the executive and legislative branches and conflicts
over authoritative interpretations.
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES
A. INTRODUCTION
Level 3 of the Williams model covers the evolvement of the legislative,
executive, and judicial role in C2 (See Figure 4-1). The legislative, executive, and
judicial role in C2 evolved from the Preamble which provides the objective, "to provide
for common defence," and the Constitution which specifies the division of authority
related to the obtainment of the objective.
The American people have provided the national government with a strong
ideology and heritage, appreciation for diplomacy, strong military force, technological
and economic strength, and intelligence to implement the national security policy and
thereby protect the national interest and accomplish the objective for "common
defence."
Using the authority specified in the Constitution, the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches plan, direct, coordinate, and control the utilization of the "common
defence" elements provided by the American people for protecting the national interests
and achieving the objectives for governance. The national government sets the policies,
organizations, procedures, and strategies for using, preserving, and/or developing the
sound features belonging to the elements of "common defence." The national
government constantly creates, modifies, and deletes parts or all of the policies,
organizations, procedures, and strategies to enhance and facilitate the protection of
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environment and internal United States change. The process is an evolving and tends
to change along with the elements of "common defence."
Policy is "a definite course or method of action" selected from among alternatives
by the national government "and in light of given conditions to guide and determine
present and future decisions." [Ref. 26, p. 910]
Organization is "the administrative and functional structure" for the resources
applied toward the accomplishment of "common defence." [Ref. 26, p. 831]
Procedure is "a series of steps followed in a regular definite order" to achieve
a "common defence" related function. [Ref. 26, p. 937]
Strategy is "the science and art of employing the political, economic,
psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the
maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war." [Ref. 26, p. 1165]
Since the three branches share the authority of the national government,
potentially, they develop and scrutinize all policies, procedures, organizations, and
strategies from three perspectives. Each perspective is uniquely focused on the
accomplishment of the objectives for governance.
The resulting policies, procedures, organizations, and strategies frequently
represent a compromise or consensus view. There is strength in the adaptation of
policy, procedures, organization, or strategy through compromise or consensus view
as long as the derivation comes out of the specified process in the Constitution. The
strength rests with compliance by the mass of the people.
This chapter covers how the legislative, executive, and judicial branches set goals
and implement policies, organizations, procedures, and strategies for "common defence."
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B. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN C2
The Constitution grants to the legislative branch numerous powers pertaining to
C2. Each branch shares it powers with the other branches. Each of the powers resting
in the legislative branch may be classified as legislative, executive, and/or judicial in
nature. In other words, many functions performed by the legislative branch may be
better classified as Judicial or executive in nature. Nevertheless, the functions
performed by the legislative branch play a vital role in C2. In the book, Foreign
Policy Makers: President vs. Congress , David M. Abshire states the following.
What Congress does or does not do, has become a vital determinant in shaping
war and peace, diplomacy, arms control, the nuclear balance, energy sufficiency,
and foreign economic policy.. .Strategic, political, and economic assessments in
foreign relations increasingly rest upon analyses of the Congress. [Ref. 27, p. 6]
The United States military is under and upholds the public law. Through the
Constitution and public law, the legislature exercises C2.
The legislative role in C2 is divided into information system, organization and
policy setting, budgetary control over strategy, declarative, approving authority, and
oversight functions.
1. Information System
The adequacy of the Congress' information system determines the
effectiveness of analysis by the legislative branch. Congress' proficiency is limited
by the analytical accuracy, insightfulness, and timeliness of information received.
Within the legislative branch, there exists an internal information system
for information gathering, processing, and transfer which provides the foundation for
the congressional role in C2. Offices responsible for the internal information system
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are the Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, Congressional
Committees and their Staffers, Congressional Budget Office, Office of Technology
Assessment, and Library of Congress.
The bulk of the Congressional work is performed in the Committees. The
Committees are responsible for staffing proposal and formulating legislation. The
Committees supporting "common defence" are the House of Representative's
Appropriation, Armed Services, Budget, and Foreign Affairs Committees and the
Senate's Appropriation, Armed Services, Budget, and Foreign Relations Committees.
Congressional actions pertaining to "common defence" are strongly influenced and
directed by these committees and their sub-committees. The Committees and their
sub-committees frequently hold hearings and meetings to discuss important issues
concerning "common defence" and to ensure the thorough development of all
viewpoints. Members of the executive branch are frequent participants in the hearings
of the committees.
In addition, the executive branch reports information to the legislative
branch. The Constitution requires a State of the Union Address by the President and
provisions in the United States Code require periodic reporting on important "common
defence" issues by key personnel of the executive department.
On a formal and informal level, Congress receives information from many
special interest groups. These groups work hard to monitor and influence current
decisions in order to protect and/or enhance their present and future welfare.
After all the information is gathered, filtered, and analyzed. Congress makes
many crucial decisions. The decisions of Congress are made through the voting
42
process and, unless the President vetoes or the Supreme Court rules unconstitutional,
we have a public law. Presidential vetoes may be overridden by a two-third vote and
Supreme Court rulings may be overturned by the amendment process.
2. The Organization and Policy Setting Function
The Constitution gives to the legislative branch the authority to "make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers
specified in the Constitution. The public law establishes and institutionalizes policies
and government organizations for C2. The setting of policies and organization is
important to the orderly, fair, efficient, and effective orchestration of the military role
in "common defence."
The organization and policy setting function is a shared power with the
President. The legislative and executive branches plan, coordinate, control, and direct
the provisions for "common defence" at minimum cost to the American people.
The legislative branch has passed several enactments which set policy and
the organization for C2. These enactments range from federal laws which specify the
organization for the upper levels of "common defence" related departments and
agencies in the executive branch to specific policies concerning foreign military sales
or conduct of service members. The federal laws known as United States Code (USC)
are constantly being reviewed, changed, or updated as necessary. Some of the
enactments related to C2 follows:
• The National Defense Act of 1916 set the trend for twentieth century
administrative and policy setting. In this act, Congress made one specification
which stated that the Regular Army would "be adequately organized and
equipped to meet any sudden emergencies." [Ref. 16, p. 6] For the first time,
the United States recognized a peacetime need for a strong national defense.
Also, the selection of "national defense" in the act's title in lieu of "common
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defence" indicates the American people's acceptance of federalism. However,
the implementation of the act fell short of expectations. The bombing of Pearl
Harbor by the Japanese is attributable to the shortfalls in implementing the act.
This act has since been rescinded.
The Neutrality Act of 1937 "prohibited export of arms and munitions to any
belligerent nations." In this act, Congress establishes a policy supporting
isolationism by adapting neutrality posture toward the war in Europe. [Ref. 16,
p. 427]
The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 was an effort to equip non-aggressor nations, so
that they could prevent the spread of aggressor forces to American soil. [Ref.
16, p. 458]
Congress passed the War Powers Act of 1973 over Presidential veto to:
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in
hostilities or in such situations.
The War Powers Act stipulated three conditions where the President may
introduce US forces into hostilities and they are: "(1) declaration of war, (2)
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."
The act stipulated consultation and reporting requirements by the President
as well as Congressional procedures to review and end the deployment.
Controversy surrounds the act from the President perspective as curtailment
of his rights as chief executive and commander in chief to protect Americans
abroad and from liberal congressmen who feel that the act granted more
power to the President than he was entitled under the Constitution. [Ref. 28,
p. 833]
The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments establish the national
security organization as known today. The purpose of this act reads as
follows:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a
comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide
for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the
departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the
national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three
military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the
United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority,
and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction
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under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these
departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or
specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to
such commands;... [Ref. 29, p. 1]
The organization for national security as known today was derived through the
evolvement of this act. The original act created the Department of Defense
(DOD), Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC) and staff, Central
Intelligence Agency and its Director and Deputy Director, Operational Commands,
Service Departments, Defense Agencies, Joint Chief of Staff and its chairman and
joint staff. The organization for national security is shown in Figure . The role,
power, and responsibilities of these executive departments, executives, agencies,
commands, and staff may be found in Title 10 and 50 of USC.
• Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Acts and Public Laws/Resolution on War
Powers, Collective Security, and Related Materials specify the United States
policies and objectives for foreign relations by country and/or treaty. [Ref. 28]
• Other Administrative Laws govern such things as military acquisition, civilian
and military personnel policies, research and development, etc.
After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Joint Congressional Investigating
Committee cited the following two general categories as the cause of American
deficiencies: "first, those errors which resulted from the presence of command by
mutual cooperation; and, second, those which resulted from the bad judgment displayed
by the two commanders [Ref. 16, p. 574]." The current policies and organizations
corrects the problem of "command by mutual cooperation." Congress has exercised
effective C2 through the organization and policy setting function.
3. The Budgetary Control Function
Through the budgetary process, Congress provides control over the
organization, policy, and strategy employed by the United States for "common
defence." Congress thoroughly reviews the budget proposal submitted by the President
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for justification and adequacy of all expenditures. Congress evaluates the budget from
a micro and macro management level.
The Congressional budget process produces the authorizations and
appropriations bills. The authorizations bills approve programs and set ceilings for
how much to spend on each program. The appropriations bills authorize the
expenditure of money for authorized program and within the ceilings of the
authorizations bills.
At the macro level, Congress and the President decide the level of
expenditures for "common defence." Congress and the President face the challenge
of providing for the objectives of governance in an environment of limited resources
and expanding requirements. The "common defence" objective competes for the
limited funds against the other objectives for government. The level of expenditures
for "common defence" influences the organization, policy, and strategy.
Also, the Congress at the macro level faces the challenge of reviewing the
President's proposed budget for adequacy of funding for Operations and Support, force
modernization, research and development, and military constructions. Congress matches
the budget proposal of the President against the preparedness of the forces for low
intensity conflict (LIC), conventional warfare, and nuclear warfare in the upcoming year
and future years. Uncertainty prevails in the President's proposed budget and the
Congressional decision. However, the President and Congress tackle their budget
responsibility with earnestness because the future security of the United States is at
stake.
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Through the budgetary process, Congress at the macro level determines the
force levels and the make-up of the force. Congress places ceilings through
authorizations for the force strength. These ceilings restrict the composition of the
military force by service departments.
During the budgetary process at the micro level, Congress validates new
operational and developmental requirements when deciding whether a program should
exist. Normally, requirements are derived from deficiencies and/or forecasted increase
in force warfare or administrative capability from technological improvements at the
technical, tactical, campaign, or strategic levels of "common defence." The adaptation
of these programs and the eventual fielding of the programs' output influence and
direct the performance of the military art at the technical, tactical, campaign, or
strategic levels of "common defence." The spectrum for the levels of "common
defence" ranges from the technical involving the performance of tasks by the individual
soldier to the strategic involving the summative application of means to obtain the
national objective(s). Through the validation of programs, Congress influences and
directs the organization, policy, and strategy for "common defence."
Congress decides the funding level for each individual program on an annual
basis. The initial funding level for a program determines the amount and type of
program output to be purchased or whether the program is continued. Reductions in
funding for a program during subsequent years may cause delays or changes in the
fielding plan, escalation of cost per program output, selection of less than optimum
program output, and/or the discontinuation of the program.
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The choice to extensively micro-manage a program is usually based on
threshold cost level; risk assessments; perceived mismanagement; or reports of fraud,
waste, and abuse. Occasionally, extensive micro-management may result from a
Congressmember receiving concerns from constituents. Whenever Congress decides to
extensively micro-manage, they may select to review and influence all aspects of the
program.
4. Approving Authority Function
The Congress serves as approving authority for all presidential appointments.
Through this authority, the Congress influences the course of decision making in the
Executive and Judicial branches of government. The Congressional membership has
qualification expectation for each position filled by presidential appointment and
requiring their approval. Congress uses thorough investigation and approval hearings
to assess the philosophical position, moral character, spiritual sobriety, and the
leadership and managerial potential of the presidential nominees. Also, special interest
groups or individuals supply Congress with ample information on the nominee's
background.
The person nominated for the various "common defence" related positions
is very crucial. The presidential appointments are for designated military and civilian
positions. The authority going with the various positions may include a combination
of controlling vast amount of national resources, influencing and/or deciding on nuclear
weapons release, committing United States forces, establishing national security policy
and strategy, etc.
48
Congress with the President shares the responsibility for the quality of
leadership and management at the upper levels of the National Security related
departments.
5. The Declarative Function
The authority of Congress to declare war is called the declarative function
in this paper. Congress used the declarative function to declare war during World War
I and II, the Mexican War, the War of 1812, and the Spanish-American War of 1898.
The United States has fought several other wars without a Congressional declaration
of war.
During a declaration of war, there is a mobilization of American warfighting
capability, work force, and defense industrial complex; and an increase in the
President's power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. The increase in
Presidential power comes partially from a Congressional delegation of power in order
to focus leadership and obtain the aggressive execution of the war.
The War Powers Act mentioned earlier discusses the situation where the
President has directed US armed forces into hostile or potentially hostile environments.
The US fought the Korean, Vietnam, and Civil Wars without a formal declaration of
war. The Civil War was considered a national emergency and the President as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief mobilized the nation. The Vietnam and Korean
Wars were very controversial and the American people and Congress questioned the
President's authority' throughout and after these conflicts. It is important for the
President to exercise the Constitutional process if he intends to hold public support.
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6. Congressional Oversight
The Constitution implies a requirement for Congressional oversight when
it authorizes the legislative branch "to try all impeachment" and "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the authorities granted
to the branches of the Government. To perform these authorizations, Congress
performs oversight over C2 and many other activities of the Executive and Judicial
branch. The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act "directs all congressional committees
to exercise oversight over agencies and programs under their jurisdiction." [Ref. 30, p.
60]
Congressional oversight has really increased over the last forty years. In
the book. Congressional Involvement and Relations: A Guide for Department of
Defense Program Managers , the Defense Systems Management College cites the
following reasons for increased Congressional oversight:
• Fraud, waste and abuse in the executive branch.
• Conscientious efforts to ensure that limited resources are utilized most
effectively for national security, internal social harmony and the execution of
other national policies.
• "Big government," involving itself more in the lives of citizens and resultant
dissatisfaction.
• Conversely, failure of or skepticism of the abilities of government to deliver
as promised
• Availability of more congressional staff, thus allowing for more attention in
this area.
• Assertion by Congress of authority' in the 1970s after years of the strong
presidency, with the Vietnam War and Watergate opportunities the prime
examples.
50
• Increasing complexity of issues begging solutions which need to be aired.
• Personal objectives of Members seeking recognition.
• Display committee initiative and aggressiveness in dealing with agencies and
forestall appearance of inactivity or comfortable relationships.
• Finally, the feeling "things just aren't being done as well as they should. [Ref.
30, pp. 60-61]
The Constitution grants to Congress "the power to try all impeachments."
This is Congress's most powerful oversight capability. Congress must remain aware
of the performance of all personnel in government. Congress held impeachment
hearings against President Andrew Johnson in 1868, however the impeachment charges
were not approved. Several federal judges have been impeached over the years.
President Nixon resigned rather than possibly face impeachment charges. The
impeachment power of Congress is truly powerful, but can only be enforced as long
as Congress keeps abreast of what is going on.
The Constitution requires the President from time to time to make a "State
of the Union Address" and Congress through provisions within public laws requires key
executive department officials to submit verbal and written reports on key issues.
[Ref. 31] These reports provides insight into how well the executive department
complies with public law and meets the objective for governance. The reports may
address various issues ranging from perceived shortfalls in the current public law to
potential alternatives for solutions to the status of individual programs. This feedback
loop enhances Congress a capability to implement control.
Congress holds regular hearings during the budgetary process in search of
information to judge whether the current organizations, public policies, procedures.
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and strategies meet the objectives of governance or produce a less than optimal
solution. These hearings permit Congress to impose accountability over the Executive
Department.
Congress holds Investigative hearings as a means of oversight. These
hearings may involve an effort to check compliance by an individual or organization
with public law. The Iran Contra Hearings were investigative in nature. Non-
compliance with public law may lead to criminal prosecution against involved
individuals and/or tighter reporting and oversight procedures placed over an
organization.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) performs audits of programs and
operations to determine their efficiency and effectiveness and compliance with public
law. The GAO provides the Congress with an independent assessment of how
programs and operations are functioning. Independent assessment furnishes an unbias,
reliable evaluation of programs and operations performance. The responsible committee
often designates the specific programs and operations for GAO audit.
Congressional inquiries serve as another method of oversight.
Congressmembers or their staff may request a reply to an issue. The issue may have
been raised by a constituent or of concern to the requestor. The President has directed
the Executive Departments to give timely replies to these inquiries.
Congressional Committee Staff keeps the Congress informed of the pertinent
information concerning programs and operations. The staff is very professional and
knowledgeable of C2 and serves frequently as the eyes, ears, and information filter for
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the Congressional Committees. The staff enhances the oversight capability of
Congress.
Congressional trips are another means of performing oversight. During the
1970s when Congress was considering the reduction of the forward deployed forces in
NATO, Senator Sam Nunn made a Congressional trip to Europe and came back to
successfully lead the fight in Congress against force reduction. The information gained
during Congressional trips is a vital source of information for oversight. [Ref. 32, p.
1331]
Congress uses the legislative veto as a tool to control the executive
departments. Under the legislative veto, Congress establishes law "which allows the
President to put forth a proposal, subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress."
[Ref. 33, pp. 82-83] Congress has used legislative veto method of legislation to
control reorganizations within the executive departments. Legislative veto has been an
effective means of Congressional oversight.
The OTA and Congressional Research Services have also enhance the
oversight capabilities. The OTA provides assessments of technology application and
potential utilities. The Congressional Research Services "advise committees in the
analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of legislative proposals; assist in determining the
advisability of enacting a proposal; estimate its probable results; and evaluate alternate
methods of accomplishing the same results."
C. THE EXECUTIVES ROLE IN C2
The Constitution states that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." The Constitution designate the President as
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Commander in Chief, Head of State, and Chief Executive. In his Oath of Office, the
President swears to "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States" and
"to the best of his "Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." Also, the President has appointment authority with "the Advice and
Consent of the Senate" and legislative veto authority. The role of the President is also
vital to C2. [Ref 34, p. xii]
Over the years, the executive department has grown larger and larger and the
Presidency has become more and more difficult. As the executive department
increased in size and scope of mission, the government's bureaucracy became more
intense, the necessity to delegate authority between the President and the executors
increased, and the span of control became greater. In 1798, Congress with the
approval of the United States established the State Department. Shortly there after, the
War and Navy Departments were founded. Today, there are thirteen cabinet level
departments, fifty-one Independent Establishments and Government Corporations, and
ten executive offices under the supervision of the President.
Beyond a doubt, the President has a very difficult job. The American people
judge the President on the nation's accomplishment of the objectives for governance.
Their judgment tends to be a mixture between fairness and critical. In performing his
C2 role, the President must focus on all the pertinent considerations of an issue.
The President uses all of his assigned power to lead and manage the executive
department.
This section looks at the President's national mandate, legislative role, definition
of national interest, leadership/management strategy, appointment authority and
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delegation of authority, utilization of authority delegated to him by Congress, and
national security policy.
1. The National Mandate
The President is the only elected public figure with a national mandate
from the populist. Whereas the Senators have a state-wide mandate and the
Representatives have a state-wide or district of the state view, the President is the
only official elected nationwide. The national mandate is a term used whenever the
President is newly or re-elected by a convincing margin Die national mandate implies
that the majority of the public supports the values, judgment, and platform of the
President and therefore, Congress and the government bureaucracy should support his
platform.
The President uses the evidence of a national mandate as a tool to push
key provisions from his platform through enactment by Congress and to inspire support
from the government bureaucracy. President Reagan's victory in 1980 was perceived
as a national mandate for stronger defense capability. As a result, the United States
underwent a defense build-up of three percent above inflation. [Ref. 4, pp. 68-69]
The national mandate may work two ways. If the platform of the President-
elect calls for a strong national defense, then it works for defense. The national
mandate works against defense, if the President-elect platform calls for a reduction in
defense expenditure or strength.
2. Defining National Interest
The President along with Congress plays a key role in defining National
Interest. Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane identified the use of the
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national interest "concept in two different ways: first, as a criterion to assess what is
at stake in any given situation and to evaluate what course of action is "best"; second,
as a justification for decisions taken." [Ref. 35, p. 218]
Normally, the President comes into office with pre-conceived notions of
the National Interest. This notion is usually changed as he becomes privileged to the
vast information made available to the President of the United States and his
perspective of the world becomes broader in scope.
Over the years, the following have surfaced again and again as part of our
national security interest:
• The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values and institutions intact and its people secure.
• The promotion of freedom's growth, democratic institutions intact and free-
market economies throughout the world, linked by fair and open international
trade.
• The security, stability and well-being of our allies and other nations friendly
to our interests.
• The opposition to the expansion of influence, control or territory by nations
hostile to freedom and to other fundamental values shared by America and its
allies. [Ref. 36, p. 8]
In the prepared statement of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Strategy Hearings held by the
Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate in 1987, national interest is
viewed as follows:
Identifying U.S. National Security Interests - these encompass both broad ideals
(freedom, human rights, economic prosperity) and substantive concerns (territorial
integrity, U.S. interests abroad, access to world markets and resources, a
supportive international order). [Ref. 37, p. 412]
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This fundamental categorization of national interest into ideals and substantive concerns
is correct but lacks a yard stick by which ideals and substantive concerns can be
measured.
On the basis of national security interests, the United States develops national
security objectives, policy, and strategy.
In the book, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of
Priorities
,
Donald E. Nuechterlein sets a framework for the evaluation of world events
impact on national interests. Nuechterlein developed the National Interest Matrix which
is composed of two pans: first, the basic national interests and secondly, the intensities
of interest.
The basic national interest includes:
• Defense interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the
threat of physical violence directed from another state or against an externally
inspired threat to its system of government.
• Economic interests: the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being
in relations with other states.
• World order interests: the maintenance of an international political and
economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure and in which its
citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.
• Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the
citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good. [Ref. 38,
PP- 4-5]
The intensity of interest was categorized according to:
• Survival issues: when the existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy.
• Vital issues: when serious harm will very likely result to the state unless
strong measures ... are employed to counter an adverse action by another state
or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.
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• Major issues: when a state's political, economic, and ideological well-being
may He adversely affected by events and trends in the international
environment and thus requires corrective action in order to prevent them from
becoming serious threats (vital issues).
• Peripheral issues: when a state's well-being is not adversely affected by events
or trends abroad, but when the interests of private citizens and companies
operating in other countries might be endangered. [Ref. 38, pp. 8-11]
Figure 5 shows the National Interest Matrix. The analyst uses the matrix
to assess the intensity of interest for all countries involved in an issue. The national
interest matrix presents a problem in that it fails to take into account the context of the
issue and the basic interest at stake overlooks the real world view of all events.
The author feels that the national interest matrix could provide a more
idealistic and realistic perception of the American view of foreign affairs, if the matrix
was supplemented by three similar matrices having the basic interests at stake changed
to the elements of "common defence" and the analysis separated into the local,
regional, and international context of the issues. This modification takes into account
that the United States perpetuates the elements of "common defence" with its national
security policy and may often involve itself in local issues because of local, regional,
or international concerns. The local view of an issue takes into consideration the effect
of the incident's local impact on the United States. The regional and international
view of an issue takes into consideration the projected regional and international impact
on the United States. (See Figures 6, 7, and 8)
In 1954, Vietnam at the local level had peripheral impact on the United
States. At the regional and international level, there were vital ideology and major
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Figure 5. The National Interest Matrix
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Figure 6. Local View of Issue
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Figure 7. Regional View of Issue.
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Figure 8. International View of Issue
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diplomacy and military force impact stemming from Vietnam. Many strategic planners
felt that if Vietnam failed there would be a domino effect.
By identifying the elements of "common defence" and categorizing the intensity
of interest, the President and his advisers could access world events as they impact the
United States, individual allies, and the involved countries.
3. The President's Legislative Role in C2
The President works with the legislature to set the organization and policy
for "common defence" and to formulate the budget for orchestration and execution of
"common defence." The Constitution granted the needed authority for the President to
fulfill the above functions.
First, the President has veto power over all legislative enactments passed
by Congress. The Congress may overrule the presidential veto if two-thirds or more
of the legislature decides to do so. The Presidential review of all legislature keeps him
involved in the legislative process. The President by virtue of his national mandate
provides a national perspective to the legislative process.
Second, the Constitution states that the President "shall from time to time
give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient..." This
authority permits the President to focus the attention of Congress and the nation on
issues of national concern. Proper use of this authority enables the President to keep
in balance the key aspects of American society.
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Next, the President, as Chief Executive Officer, tends to have the best
information. This permits the President to work with Congress from a position of
knowledge. As a result, the President is respected and has influence over the decisions
of Congress.
Lastly, Executive Orders are a means for the President to execute his
legislative role. The President's issuance of Executive Orders is based upon his
"vested power" under the Constitution and the statutory law.
As a participant in the legislative process, the President influences the
legislative decisions on the organization and policies for C2 and budgetary bills.
4. Powers Delegated to the President by Congress
Congress over the years has delegated much of its Constitutional powers
to the President. In the author's opinion, Congress delegates its power to the President
for the following reasons:
• The President is better able to cope with time sensitive national emergencies
than the Congress. Time sensitive decision making is an expected reality in
the international environment. The timeliness of decisions influences and
determines the outcome of many events considered vital to the national
interest. The timeliness and quality of decisions and speedy execution of the
decided course of action may prevent the escalation of an emergency into
nuclear holocaust or regional conflict. The organization of government permits
an orderly flow of information on a real time basis to and from the President.
The president has an executive staff which provides tremendous information
processing and validation support. And finally, the President can make split
second decisions based on the recommendation of his staff.
• The Constitution places the President as Chief Executive, Commander in Chief,
and Head of State, therefore the President serves as the focal point of
government. The Constitution does not provide a central focal point for
accountability and responsibility in the Congress.
• Past President's performance during national and international crisis brought
greater dependencies on the Presidency for national leadership and
management. The Presidency played a crucial role during the Civil War,
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World War I, and World War II and took the lead in the establishment of
organizations and policies to correct economic problems of The Great
Depression. Next to the Revolutionary War, these crisis are the most
remembered and written about experiences of our heritage.
• Whenever the Congress and President through legislative enactment establish
government institutions, a certain amount of Congressional authority is passed
to the President.
During and after the Vietnam War, the Congress has tried to regain much of the power
forfeited or delegated.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 changed the way that budget
proposals were generated. For fiscal years after 1921, the Executive branch became
responsible for the development and submission of a proposed budget.
The 1974 Budget Act and the Graham-Rudman Balanced Budget Act are
attempts by Congress to regain some discretion in the budgetary objective. The 1974
Budget Act established "a much more disciplined procedure for congressional
consideration of defense and other requests" and "created a rudimentary systems
analysis capability." [Ref. 39, p. 559] The Graham-Rudman Balanced Budget Act
directs the movement of budgetary allocation from a deficit trend to a balanced budget.
The employment of national forces into hostilities abroad or at home is a
very controversial issue. The President has employed the national forces into hostile
or potentially hostile situations abroad to protect the life and property of American
citizens, to fulfill the nation's commitment to the United Nations or other treaties, and
to carry out the nation's goal for containment. In the case of the Korean War and the
Lebanon Situation, the United States acted as a part of the United Nations. In other
cases like Grenada, Dominican Republic, and Libya, the United States acted unilaterally
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to allegedly protect the life and property of American citizens. In Vietnam, Greece,
and Turkey, the United States acted to obtain containment. In each of these cases, the
Congress issued some form of Resolution supporting the position of the President. The
War Powers Act of 1973 addresses these issues. Congress passed the War Power Act
over Presidential veto. In the War Powers Act, CongTess delegates responsibility to
and restricts authority of the President.
Through the Presidency, the executive department generates seventy percent
of the proposed legislation. As the executive department grew larger and larger, many
experts were attracted to government service in the various disciplinary areas.
Congress takes advantage of this experience when it accepts proposals from the
executive department.
5. Leadership/Management Strategy
The way that the President makes his decisions and the prevalent tendencies
and outcome of these decisions permit an analysis of the President's
leadership/management strategy for "common defence." Effective C2 is the hopeful
result of his leadership/management strategy for "common defence."
a. Use of Appointment Authority
The President appoints with the consent of Congress the Justices of
the Supreme Court, Federal Judges, and key officials of the Executive Branch. Each
President has authority to appoint the top officials of the Executive Offices and
Departments. The appointment of officials to any of these offices does not concur
with the Presidential term. A President may serve one or two terms of office without
making an appointment to the Supreme Court, Federal bench. Independent
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Establishment or Government Corporations. During a four year term, the President
may or may not be able to change the political orientation of the Supreme Court,
Federal bench, Independent Establishment, and Government Corporations. Nevertheless,
the President's appointment authority is vital to his C2 function.
The selection of quality personnel who share the values and outlook
of the President is important for all appointed positions. The bureaucracy of large
government, large span of control, and multi-levels between point of execution and
policy/decision makers necessitate the appointment of well qualified personnel. The
proficiency of these appointees can set the tone of an administration. The days of
political patronage have not passed but are well tempered by the necessity for quality
personnel in the key staff and cabinet positions.
The Presidential appointees that are closely related to "common
defence" in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments
include:
• Central Intelligence Agency - the Director and Deputy Director;
• Department of Defense - the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under and Assistant
Secretaries, Inspector General, General Counsel, Secretaries and Assistant and
Under Secretaries of the military departments, Chairman to Joint Chief of
Staff, Unified and Specified CENCs, Chief of Staff for Air Force and Army,
Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corp, and others.
• National Security Council - National Security Adviser and Secretary;
• The State Department - the Secretary, Deputy Secretary-, Under and Assistant
Secretaries, Inspector General, legal adviser, and ambassadors.
65
These positions are very crucial to C2. A careful look at the organization for National
Security reveals the huge responsibility and potential possession of great authority in
the above positions.
b. Delegation of Authority
Public law leaves to the President's discretion how much of his
executive authority to be delegated to the Executive Offices and Departments. An
exception to this rule is the Nuclear release authority which public law prohibits the
President from delegating. The President's confidence in the appointees proficiency,
credibility, and consistency with his position determines the amount of delegation.
The President may decide to centralize decision making and setting
policy in the oval office or decentralize it as much as possible. The proper level for
decision making and setting policy on "common defence" related issues varies with the
nature of the situation. Ideally, the President places authority at the level that he feels
most comfortable.
Sometimes the President may seek advice and rely on someone other
than the secretary of an Executive Department or head of an Executive Office. This
situation leads to potential breakdown of the system during time sensitive emergencies
and increases the complexity of an already complex system. In this case, the formal
organizational structure is replaced by an informal structure.
With the power to appoint, there is an implied power to hold the
appointees accountable and responsible to the President. The supervisory responsibility
includes the authority to fire. The President seldom fires an individual, but tends to
tactfully demand an appointee's resignations.
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c. Ability to Integrate and Coordinate
The Executive Office of the President functions to aid the President in
staffing and organizing coherent programs. The Executive Office enables the President
to integrate the elements of "common defence", perform C2, and function as a national
leader and manager. The offices are:
The White House Office;
Office of Management and Budget;
National Security Council;
Office of Policy Development;
Office of the United States Trade Representative;
Council of Economic Advisers;
Council on Environmental Quality;
Office of Science and Technology Policy;
Office of Administration; and
Office of the Vice President of the United States.
These offices play a vital role in the leadership and management capability of the
President.
The offices permit an external tranference of the President's will and
values proportional to the level of world activity. The Executive offices function as
the nervous system for the President on all areas of national interest. They may
perform information gathering and processing, coordinate the development and analysis
of options, coordinate the implementation of decisions, and verify compliance with and
success of decisions for the President, if he so chooses.
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The Executive Offices help the President to answer the following
questions:
Who will constitute the policymaking group for different kinds of issues?
How will policy alternatives he identified, discussed, and evaluated within the
policymaking group?
How will participants in the group satisfy their needs for information and
analysis?
Will general advice or specialized inputs to the policymaking task be expected
from each participant?
What process will be followed in attempting to form consensus within the
group on behalf of the policy that is chosen?
What "rules" will govern the expression of disagreement, the regulation of
competition among participants to influence the leader's choice, and the scope
of bargaining and compromise during different phases of policymaking?
How will the task of synthesizing the various elements of complex policy
problems be handled?
In arriving at a decision, what relative weight will be given by the executive
to arriving at the technically best alternative as against one that commands the
desired kind and magnitude of consensus within the group?
What degree of support, however expressed, will be expected of the
participants once a decision has been made by the executive?
What "rules" will govern reconsideration of a past decision or policy?" [Ref.
35. p. 99]
The answer to these questions about "common defence" determines the President's
leadership/management strategy.
d Ability to Communicate
In the age of mass media, the President's ability to effectively
communicate his position on issues to the American people. Congress, his subordinates,
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allies, and other nations determines the success or failure and ease of implementing
"common defence" policy. Roosevelt's "fireside chats" over radio are remembered
today for calming the fears of the American people during World War II and the Great
Depression. So often, the decisions in Congress on "common defence" related issues
are swayed one way or another solely, on the merits of his communications skill. The
President's ability to communicate is vital to C2.
6. President's Role in Setting C2 Aspect of National Security Policy
Why was "common defence" replaced by National Security in 1947 and by
National Defense in 1916? The replacement of "common defence" may easily be
attributed to an outlook of acceptance for federalism. Whether addressed as "common
defence", national security, or national defense, the meaning is the same. The National
Security Act of 1947 and its amendment has practically externalized and
institutionalized the processes performed by the President as Commander in Chief and
Head of State. National security asserts that defense policy is no longer totally
compartmented from foreign policy. These policies brought together with ideology,
economic and technological strength, and intelligence create the elements of a sound
national security policy. Yet, the bottomline is the accomplishment of "common
defence."
Ironically, the President and Congress have not formalized the process for
reaching a compromise or consensus on national security policy, except for the
budgetary' process. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 took measures
toward formalizing the national security policy process with the requirement for "the
President to submit an annual report to the Congress on the national security strategy
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of the United States." [Ref. 40, p. 9] However, this measure falls short of correcting
the problem cited by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, chaired by David Packard that "there is no rational system whereby the
executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national
military strategy, the forces to carry it out and the funding that should be provided. .
.
." [Ref. 41, p. xvii] In some kind of way the system needs to create a process where
the President and the Congress reach compromise and consensus on national security
strategy and policy.
Judging by the United States deployment of military forces, diplomatic
agreements, use of ideology, intelligence gathering effort, and perpetuation of
technology and economic strength, some basic national security policies may be drawn.
This approach to obtaining national security strategy and policy is non-deterministic and
dependant on empirical analysis of results and outputs. A more systemic, deterministic
and theoretical basis of formulating national security strategy and policy is desirable.
In the executive branch, the President has ultimate policy making and
implementation responsibility for "common defence." Other active participants in the
policy making and implementing decisions for "common defence" in the executive
branch include the National Security Council, Defense Department, State Department,
Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Commerce, Department of Treasury, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, United States Information Agency (USIA), Agency
for International Development, and the Office of Management and Budget. His
fulfillment of this responsibility depends upon his leadership/management strategy.
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The United States postures and prepares its military to be an instrument of
deterrence and, if necessary, to fight and win, today or tomorrow, anywhere in the
world at each level of conflict. The military posturing and operational readiness of the
United States are constrained by the nation's limited resources, the trade-off between
the elements of "common defence," the trade-off between the different military
programs, and the trade-off between providing "common defence" and accomplishing
the other objectives for governance. The presence of uncertainty in the world
environment complicates military posturing and preparedness for "common defence."
The elements of uncertainty includes the unpredictability of results, technological
advancements, international personalities, political pressures, and world conditions from
day to day or in the future. The President along with Congress must select how to
best use the limited resources in order to accomplish the objectives for governance.
At the Presidential level, C2 involves the maintenance and readiness of a
deterrent military force and the systemic coordination of all five elements of "common
defence." The military role is a unique element of "common defence" because it has
posturing and operational states. During peace, a strong military posture works with
ideology, economic and technological strength, intelligence, and diplomacy to prevent
war and promote free trade. During conflict, a strong operational military force works
with ideology, economic and technological strength, intelligence, and diplomacy to
quickly terminate it at the lowest possible level. In its operational state, the nation has
used the military as the last or most serious recourse to solving threats to national
objectives.
71
During war and crisis, the nature of the military changes from a state of
raw potential energy to a strong operational force. The military is employed in war
or hostilities for "common defence" when:
• Military posturing and the other elements of "common defense" have failed or
project little hope of safeguarding crucial national interests; and
• The military option poses less risk or offers an acceptable more permanent
solution than the other elements.
History teaches that nations may resort to military action to resolve threats from time
to time.
The author feels that the ultimate test of the nation's survival depends upon
its ability and willingness to fight and defend our Constitution.
D. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
The courts of the United States have made rulings on constitutionality and public
law compliance of actions by the executive and legislative branches of national and
state governments. Through these rulings, the Judicial Branch influences and directs
the accomplishment of "common defence." These rulings have covered such subjects
as the President's War and Emergency Powers, individual rights, legislative veto, the
Constitution and Collective security, the military power overseas, the United Nations
and federal-state relations, executive power, and legislative power. [Ref. 11]
Earlier, it was mentioned that compromised and consensus decisions work well
as long as they were enacted under the constimtional process but there is a caveat to
that statement. The caveat is that they must comply with the constitution and public
law. The Judicial systems are charged to verify compliance of individual, groups, and
governmental with the constitution and public law.
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V. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE, POLICY, AND STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
In the Constitution, the American people set the framework for government,
establish the objective for governance, and divide the authority of the government
between the branches; also, the American people bound the national interests; but the
branches of the government develop the national security interests, objectives, policy
and strategy to meet the challenges of the today's world environment and expected
world environment at a future period in time. A part of the government's resource
expenditure today is dedicated to ensuring the capability of the U.S. to accomplish the
objective of governance in expected world environments in the future. The force
organization and combat readiness processes (discussed in Chapter 6 and 7,
respectively) require long lead time. The government sets the national security
interests, objectives, policy, and strategy within the boundary, objectives, and
framework set by the American people in the Constitution and otherwise so that an
appropriate force organization may be implemented to accomplish combat readiness.
Level 4 of the Williams model covers the role of national security objectives,
policy and strategy in C2 (See Figure 9). The author's definitions of these terms are
as follows:
• national security interests - are the combined impact on U.S. objective for
"common defence" of an internal or external issue or event from its local,
regional, international, and overall contexts.
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Figure 9. Level 4 of the Williams Model for C2
74
• national security objectives - are the expressed and implied statement of the
purpose for U.S. government involvement in an issue or event given the level
of national security interest.
• national security policy - is the guideline for the use of national power and
the scope and limitation for the commitment of the national power in an issue
or event for the accomplishment of the national security objective.
• national security strategy - is the specification of what elements of national
power should be used and how to employ these resources for the
accomplishment of national security objectives within the constraints of
national security policy.
Based on national security interests, objectives, policy and strategy, the United States
prioritizes the expenditure of resources; sets the military force structure; and determines
the required readiness of the military forces. So, the national security interests,
objectives, policy and strategy are very important to C2.
Professor Carl Jones of the Naval Postgraduate School in his class, "Decision
Making in Command," states that "obtaining the goals is the result of a process of
observation, hypothesis statement, dialogue, generalization, observation, and so forth."
[Ref. 42] Obtaining the national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy-
involves a like process.
This chapter takes a look at what is the current world environment, the executive
structure for national security, the process for developing national security interests,
objectives, policy and strategy and how the United States utilizes the national security
objectives, policy, and strategy in C2.
B. THE ENVIRONMENT
The pace of change in the world environment has increased tremendously since
World War n. Therefore, the government faces the challenge of evolving national
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security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy which are compatible and viable with
the rapidly changing world environment possessing the vestiges of varying cultures.
Given that the world environment is constantly changing, the national security interests,
objectives, policy, and strategy are dynamic products and hopefully developed through
an evolutionary process.
1. The Inheritance
Each new generation of the American people inherits and shares a nation
handed down from the previous generations. In the same sense, this generation is
making an investment today for current and future generations. For example, the
Constitution, as it reads today, is a viable, living part of the inheritance and provides
a source of pride and nationalism within the United States.
The executive and judicial decisions and legislative enactments made during
previous generations affect the lives of Americans, today, with different degrees of
impact. These decisions and enactments may have been an investment for short or
long term returns to the United States. Regardless, the decisions and enactments of
past administrations remain valid unless rescinded by due process of law or statutory
limitations. Whether rescinded or not, the impact is still being felt today because of
foregone opportunities as well as expended resources. The Revolutionary and Civil
War plus World War I and II are classic examples that affected the nation's values and
outlook on the world.
If a past administration decided to neglect national security for three or
four years or made a few bad choices, then the current and future administrations
would suffer the consequences. If a past administration established a bad alliance, then
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the current administration must cope with the political, economic, diplomatic, and
military ramifications. If the current generations give away the technological
advantages and now waste or fail to preserve scarce resources, then future generations
will suffer. The strengths and weaknesses of past administrations' decisions and
enactments are brought forward to the current administration.
Looking at the United States today, a person can easily conclude that the
past generations left to the current generation a nation possessing strong ideology,
diplomacy, technology, economy, military force, and intelligence gathering capability.
However, there is no room for complacency. There are some troubling aspects of the
economy, technology, military force, diplomacy, and intelligence gathering capability
which represent weaknesses or potential weaknesses which could cause problems.
These weaknesses represent risks which our society is sometimes forced to take
because of limited resources, bad decisions by previous generations, and natural causes.
For example, American high technology firms have been building plants
abroad in order to reduce labor costs. The American automobile industry for years
placed emphasis on production volume and variety in lieu of production quality.
American semi-conductor producers and electronic firms are unable to compete
effectively against the Japanese. The government and industry have been unable to
respond to these situations. The repercussions have been technology transfer, the lost
of jobs in the United States, trade deficit, and the lost of the multiplier benefit derived
from funds changing hands because funds are circulating abroad instead of within the
United States.
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The decisions of yesterday and today determine whether the national culture
can perpetuate and remain viable. The challenge faced by previous generations was
to pass on a nation that is prepared for the current challenges and implement measures
that will keep the nation ready for future challenges. The previous generations have
succeeded so far.
2. Communist Ideology is Aggressive
Most of the national security objectives, policy, and strategy, since World
War n, are predicated on an assumption that Communist ideology is aggressive in
nature. During the period after World War I and up through World War II , the world
looked upon communism as non-threatening. Before and during World War II,
President Roosevelt treated Stalin and Russia as a friend and ally. After World War
II. when Russia took actions considered aggressive in nature to impose puppet
Communist governments in Eastern European countries under their control, the world's
view of communism changed. The failure of the Russian Army to demobilize after
World War II interrupted the United States and its allies demobilization effort. As a
result, the United States and the Western European countries plus Canada formed the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Today, Premier Gorbachev has taken several steps of a non-aggressor nature
(Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, Perestroika, and
glasnost), but he has failed to reverse the aggressive steps of his predecessors which
caused the current posturing of NATO forces.
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A weakening of the United States and its allies' defense and alliance on
the basis of the overtures made by Gorbachev is premature and not pragmatic at the
current time. The puppet administrations of the Warsaw Pact countries still exist.
Human rights are still highly suppressed in these nations. The Berlin Wall still stands
as a symbol of repression. The Wall separating East and West Germany remains.
Movement of people in the Warsaw Pact countries within and outside of each country
is highly restricted. The Russian Army continues to police the puppet countries in
large numbers compared to NATO forces in Western Europe. And finally, the Russian
Army is still mobilized. If Gorbachev were to change the Soviet policies which caused
the deep concern of the Truman administration and the Congress of those years, then
and only then, the United States and its allies might change their policies toward
Russia.
3. The Spectrum of Warfare
Some statesmen affirm that the United States must prepare itself to wage
war at the low intensity conflict, conventional warfare, and nuclear warfare level in the
various theaters of the world.
• Low-intensity conflict - is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve
political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted
and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through
terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a
geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry,
tactics, and the level of violence. [Ref. 5, pp. 214 and 215]
• Conventional warfare - is warfare to achieve political, social, economic, or
psychological objectives with the non-use of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weaponry being the only constraint on the geographical area, tactics, weaponry,
and level of violence.
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• Nuclear warfare - is warfare involving the employment of nuclear weapons.
[Ref. 5, p. 2551
The spectrum of warfare represents the potential warfare environment which the United
States must train its forces.
C. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
The heads of two departments and two agencies are involved in the making of
national security policy. They are the DOD, State Department, CIA, and Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. With the National Security Council staff, other departments,
and selected interdepartment agencies and Government Corporations, these departments
coordinate and execute the application of ideology, military force, diplomacy,
technological and economic strength, and intelligence to influence the policies of other
nations. Each play a unique role in "common defence."
1. National Security Council.
The National Security Council consists of the President, Vice President,
Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State as members and the Director of Central
Intelligence as intelligence adviser, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff as military
adviser, and Director of Arms Control and the Disarmament as arms control adviser.
Other departments or agencies may participate at the discretion of the President.
The National Security Act of 1947 provides the following guidance on the
function and duties of the National Security Council:
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national
security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and
agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security. [Ref. 29, p. 2]
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...the duty of the Council-
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest
of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President
in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments
and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to
make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. [Ref.29, p. 2]
The National Security Council and support staff have functions and duties
to aid the President in the formulation and implementation of national security policy,
strategy, and objectives. The way that the Council and staff is used depends on the
President.
2. The CIA
The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments specify the following
duties for the CIA:
• advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national
security;
• make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination
of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the
Government as relate to the national security;
• correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government;
• performs for intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern
as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished in the Agency;
• collects, produces, and disseminates counterintelligence and foreign intelligence,
including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of
counterintelligence or foreign intelligence within the United States shall be
coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
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• collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics
production and trafficking;
• conducts counterintelligence activities outside the United States and without
assuming or performing any internal security functions, conducts
counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the
FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Attorney General;
• coordinates counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not
otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other
departments and agencies;
• conducts special activities approved by the President. No agency, except the
CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by
Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the
Congress under the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), may
conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another
agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective;
• carries out or contracts for research, development, and procurement of technical
systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
• protects the security of its installations, activities, information, property, and
employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants,
employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the
CIA, as are necessary;
• conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside
the United States as are necessary procurement and essential cover and
proprietary arrangements; and
• perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence that affect the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time
direct. [Ref. 43, pp. 515-516]
The CIA's ability to coordinate the gathering, filtering, and assessment of intelligence
information is vital to the establishment of national security policy and strategy.
3. Department of State
The United States Government Manual explains the mission and duties of
the State Department as follows:
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The Department of State advises the President in the formulation and execution
of foreign policy. As Chief Executive, the President has overall responsibility for
the foreign policy of the United States. The Department of State's primary
objective in the conduct of foreign relations is to promote the long-range security
and well-being of the United States. The Department determines and analyzes
the facts relating to American overseas interests, makes recommendations on
policy and future action, and takes the necessary steps to carry out established
policy. In so doing, the Department engages in continuous consultations with the
American public, the Congress, other U.S. departments and agencies, and foreign
governments; negotiates treaties and agreements with foreign nations; speaks for
the United States in the United Nations and in more than 50 major international
organizations in which the United States participates; and represents the United
States at more than 800 international conferences annually. [Ref. 43, p. 422]
The Secretary of State represents the Department of State as a member on the National
Security Council.
4. The Department of Defense (DOD)
The United State Government Manual describes the DOD as follows:
The Department of Defense is responsible for providing the military forces needed
to deter war and protect the security of our country....
Under the President, who is also Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense
exercises direction, authority, and control over the Departments of Army, Navy,
and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing military advice, the unified and
specified combatant commands, and various defense agencies established for
specific purposes. [Ref. 43, p. 172]
The Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary military advisor
to the National Security Council. The complete role of the Chairman is discussed in
the Chapter 6 of this thesis.
5. The United States Arm Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
The United State Government Manual describes the ACDA as follows:
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency formulates and
implements arms control and disarmament policies that will promote the national
security of the United States and its relations with other countries. At present,
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to effectively carry out its responsibilities, it prepares and participates in
discussions and negotiations with the Soviet Union and other countries on such
issues as strategic arms limitations, mutual force reductions in Central Europe,
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not now possess
them, a prohibition on chemical weapons, and monitoring the flow of arms trade
throughout the world. [Ref. 43, p. 690]
The Director of ACDA advises the NSC on Arms Control matters.
D. THE PROCESS OF SETTING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES,
POLICIES, AND STRATEGIES
The process set forth in the White House's January 1988 paper titled, National
Security Strategy of the United States , implies a sequence as follows for formulating
national security strategy:
• U.S. Interests;
• National Security Objectives;
• Identification of Threats to U.S. Interests;
• National Security Power and Policy; and
• National Security Strategy. [Ref. 44]
Step one and two of this sequence are normally performed within the National
Security Council. An issue may be generated by an individual department/agency on
some world event impacting U.S. interests. In the Preface to the report, President
Reagan wrote that "The fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year;
our interests and objectives are derived from enduring values." [Ref. 44] Although the
fundamentals of our strategy are constant and the U.S. has enduring values, the national
security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy are evolving.
84
The information gathering, filtering, assessments, and options for step three, four
and five are coordinated efforts performed by the staff of NSC, CIA, DOD, State
Department, USIA, AID, Department of Treasury, and Department of Commerce. The
work is performed separately in each department or agency or together through Senior
Interdepartmental Groups (SIG) and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG).
The decision making function for step four and five is performed by the President
or National Security Council. The output of step four and five is generally broken into
geo-political separation by sub-disciplines such as defense, economic, diplomatic, etc.
The Presidents have previously used policy papers and three types of directives
to document their position on issues elevated to their level within the Executive
Department and the national security system. The three directives are National Security
Action Memorandums (NSAM), National Security Decision Directives and Presidential
Directives. The NSC staff, SIGs, and IRGs perform the ground work for these papers
and directives. These directives are normally, highly classified. Their impacts on
national security policy are far-reaching.
The sequence could be improved by moving the national security power from
step number four to step number three. During step number three, an assessment of
the national security power of the United States and the threats against U.S. Interests
would provide insight on whether to keep, modify, or delete policies and strategies
from the previous year. The assessment would probably change the unclassified
version into a classified one.
85
E. UTILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The national security strategy is utilized by the Congress and concerned Executive
Departments and Agencies. It serves as a starting point for fulfilling their
responsibilities.
1. National Security Strategy Provides a Framework for the President
The National Security Strategy represents the product of deliberate or of
crisis planning. In either case, the National Security Strategy provides a framework
for the President to understand and fulfill his role as Chief Executive and Commander
in Chief. In the art of setting National Security Strategy, the President exercises his
leadership over the armed forces; obtains a perspective for making future tough
decisions during peace and war; and passes the commander's intent to the subordinate
operational forces.
2. Congress
In the opening remarks of the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings
on National Security Strategy, Senator Sam Nunn in 1987 stated the following:
The committee has decided to focus its initial series of hearings on U.S. national
security strategy and its military strategy component, because strategy is the only
logical starting point for both the development and the consideration of security
policies and programs and budgets... A broad understanding of strategy and
resource priorities is a necessary beginning point for a meaningful and objective
defense budget examination. The committee is not approaching these hearings
with the intention of formulating a Senate Armed Services Committee or even a
congressional alternative to our current strategy. The strategy is the responsibility
of the executive branch, including our military and civilian leadership in the
Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council.... At this
stage I have serious questions about the clarity, coherence, and consistency of our
current strategy. [Ref. 45, p. 2]
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Why would the Senate Armed Services Committee spend twelve crucial days hearing
testimony and analyzing the U.S. national security strategy? Why would a major
provision of Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act require the President to submit a
report on the National Security Strategy? The answer to both questions is intertwined.
Congress plays an active pan in the formulation and implementation of national
security strategy.
Through the budgetary and enactment processes, Congress influences and
directs the establishment of national security strategy. The Congressional statement
of national security policy is usually a subtle one found in the Authorization and
Appropriation Bills and foreign policy laws. General Maxwell D. Taylor in 1960
wrote that "The determination of U.S. strategy has become a more or less incidental
by-product of the administrative process of the defense budget." [Ref. 46, p. 137]
During the budgetary process, Congress starts its review of the proposed budget with
a macro view of the "U.S. military posture and a budget overview." During this
process, Congress conducts a thorough look at the national security policies, objectives,
strategy, and the soundness of intended resource committments against the national
security objectives and strategy. With the foreign policy and budget laws, Congress
establishes "the parameters and boundaries of acceptable policy." [Ref. 47, p. 61]
So often, the resourcing, organizing, and policy setting responsibilities of
Congress are belittled and viewed as disruptive by members of the armed forces.
Congressional resourcing, organizing, and policy setting actions may force the
modification or elimination of elements from the national security strategy as set by
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the Executive Branch. Three classic examples are the military aid to the Contras in
Nicaragua, military involvement in drug interdiction, and the SALT II treaty.
How is Congress conducting trade-offs between the elements of "common
defence" and ensuring that their enactments cause a harmonious environment for the
execution of national security policy and strategy? Although Congress has externalized
and instituted the integration and coordination of the national security policy process
in the Executive Branch, the Congress looks at the defense policy and foreign policy,
separately. The House of Representatives and the Senate have two committees which
review their respective parts of the proposed budget. Certainly, the two committees
in each body of Congress must talk to one another.
Ideally, there should be a institutionalized formal or informal process to
integrate and coordinate a recommended compromise or consensus on the priorities
for National Security Policies in Congress and between Congress and the Executive
Branch. Such a measure would force a priori focus on national security. In the
"National Security Strategy Hearings" conducted by the Senate Arms Services
Committee, Senator John W. Warner of Virginia stated:
Last year I introduced legislation, together with Senator Nunn and 26 other
Senators, a bill entitled The National Strategy Act. This initiative would require
the administration to present a national strategy assessment to a joint session of
the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee at the
beginning of each session of Congress. Further, a printed document describing
the national strategy would also be provided to each Member of the Congress.
This would enable these four key committees, the rest of the Congress, and the
Nation to have common understanding of our overall national strategy. As a
result, we could better assess how defense programs work and foreign policy fits
into this overall framework. [Ref. 48, p. 7]
Unfortunately, Senator Warner's National Security Act was not enacted.
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3. Department of Defense
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger prepared a statement for the Senate
Armed Services Committee's Hearings on National Security Strategy. He stated that
the defense portion of the national security policy and strategy determines the necessary
military capabilities. Therefore, the national security policy and strategy play an
intimate part in the DOD Planning System.
The national security policy and strategy influences and directs the
administrative, logistical, and training activities under the services, the operational
planning under the JCS and CINCs, and research and development under the Secretariat
staff. The hopeful outcome of these activities is the matching of operational
capabilities with national security policy and strategy.
F. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES,
POLICY AND STRATEGY IN C2
The C2 over the military has evolved from the following broad national security
objectives related to the military:
• to deter war, and
• when deterrence fails to fight and win the war or obtain favorable termination
of war.
From these two national security objectives, the military objectives, policy, strategy
have been derived for the spectrum of warfare.
World War II saw the addition of nuclear warfare fought all over the world
simultaneously, to the warfare spectrum of low intensity conflict and conventional
warfare. Ideally, the forces should be specially trained for a particular warfare
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environment and possess equipment and weaponry which will maximize likelihood of
the accomplishment of the national security objectives, policy and strategy. Because
of limited resources, the United States accepts greater risk with potential low-intensity
conflict and conventional warfare. When waging warfare in low-intensity conflict or
conventional warfare environment, the United States depends upon a mobilization and
training programs which enable forces to be fully trained in one environment and
adaptable to other environments. The unpreparedness of the United States to react
promptly and appropriately to either of these levels may cost the destruction of the
nation, limitations on the accomplishment of one or more objectives for governance,
or prolong the duration of conflict.
1. Nuclear Warfare
Nuclear war requires time sensitive decision making and total
preparedness/readiness of active nuclear forces. The destructiveness, range, and
delivery speed of the modem nuclear weapons dictate that the Presidents adapt a
leadership/management strategy which calls for positive control and little delay during
the transitioning of the active nuclear force from military posturing to military
operational force.
2. Low-intensity Conflict
Low intensity conflict in third world nations represents the most probable
type of warfare in the near future. Low intensity conflict is more likely because lesser
forces stand a chance of winning outright or concessions in this type of warfare. It
is a strategy to wear down the opposition till his will to resist is destroyed. The
forces may be lesser in terms of technology, finances, weaponry, etc.
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3. Conventional Warfare
For Conventional War, past Presidents have relied upon a period of
mobilization from a leveraged military posture to a military operational force. The
leverage military posture calls for the maintenance of forward deployed active forces
capable of holding the enemy for a certain number of days allowing the mobilization





Level five of the Williams Model covers the force organization as an element
of C2 over the military role in "common defence" (See Figure 10). The focus is on
the preparation of a military force organization which implements national security
strategy, follows national security policy, and provides an acceptable probability of
accomplishing national security objectives.
In the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 dated April 3, 1987, the functions
of the DOD are simply stated as follows:
As prescribed by higher authority, the Department of Defense shall maintain and
employ armed forces to:
a. Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.
b. Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United
States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.
c. Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States."
[Ref. 49, p. 3]
The DOD level looks at the institutionalized systems and force structures. The
institutionalized systems and force structures from the National Command Authorities
(NCA) downward have influence and provide direction over the military role in
"common defence." The downward look reveals the force organization in the DOD
(See Figure 1 1 ). The C2 aspect of the force organization is traceable to the
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Figure 11. Organization for "Common Defence."
94
responsibilities, the granting of authority among the staff and lines of command, and
the establishment of systems for formulating policies, plans, programs, and doctrines.
All institutionalized systems and force structures within DOD operate under the
control, direction, and authority of the Secretary of Defense.
Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF or JCS Pub 2 (Currently JCS Pub 0-2))
describes the chain of command and inter-relationship between the Departments and
Combatant Commanders for forces within the Department of Defense (DOD).
Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1 (AFSC Pub 1), The Joint Staff Officers
Guide 1988
,
provides 350-plus pages of insight into how the operational side of the
force structure works. Among these pages, many Command and Control features are
discussed. This chapter cites UNAAF and AFSC Pub 1, extensively.
The derivation of force structure is an evolutionary governmental process which
documents decisions via legislative enactment, Executive Orders, Department of
Defense Directives, Service Department Regulations, Operational Plans, and etc. With
each organization, there exists responsibility and accountability for the successful
accomplishment of assigned functions and missions. With the institutionalized system,
the decision maker imposes measures designed to insure the efficient and effective
functioning of assigned resources.
This chapter looks at organizational staff support and lines of command, and
institutionalized systems.
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B. The Stnff Support
1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assists the Secretary of
Defense in his mission as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating
to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of Defense "exercises direction,
authority, and control" over the Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and defense
agencies. The OSD is an external extension of the Secretary's management
capabilities. The OSD consists of:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
The Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense.
The Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
The Director of Administration and Management.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict.
The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).
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The Assistant to Secretary (Intelligence Oversight).
Director Net Assessment.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs).
DOD Inspector General (IG).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy).
As the name of the staff sections imply, OSD is functionally divided. The appropriate
section of Title 10 of United States Code and DOD Directives provide the purpose,
responsibilities and functions, relationships, and/or authorities of each staff section.
Former Defense Secretary Weinberger stated the following in reply to a
question submitted by Senator Towers during the Senate Arms Service Committee
Hearings on the Organization, Structure, and Decision-making Procedures of the
Department of Defense: "The OSD staff provides the technical cross-Service and major
mission analyses necessary to integrate the capabilities of the Services and to meet the
objectives identified by the President and Congress." [Ref. 50, p. 54]
OSD permits the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to effectively
function in their positions. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense manage
DOD at the macro-level. OSD frees the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
from the detailed and technical work. Therefore, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense may actively participate in the development of national security' interests,
objectives, policy and strategy and focus on the overall capabilities, limitations,
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employment, maintenance, and readiness of the U.S. forces in DOD to accomplish the
national security strategy. As the American people, Congress, and President increase
the accountability of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense adopts a
perspective leaning toward micro-management rather than macro-management.
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci when he was Deputy Secretary of
Defense on 27 March 1981 in a "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense,
Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, and Assistants to the Secretary of
Defense" delineated the division of responsibilities among OSD:
• Overall Policy, Strategy, Force Planning, and Planning Guidance
• Lead Offices : Under Secretary of Defense for Planning
• In Coordination With : JCS, Services, CINCs, OSD (NSC)
• Resource Objectives, Planning and Guidance
• Lead Offices : Research and Engineering* and Manpower, Reserve Affairs and
Logistics+
• In Coordination With : OSD and Services, as appropriate; Comptroller
• Fiscal Guidance
• Lead Offices : Comptroller, Program Analysis and Evaluation
• In Coordination With : OMB, White House, USD/P
• Program Development
• Lead Offices : Services
• Program Unification and Standardization
• Lead Offices : Research and Engineering
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• In Coordination With : OSD
• Program Review and Evaluation
• Consistency with policy
- Lead Offices : If Nuclear then Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy and, if Conventional, then Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs.
- In Coordination With : Program Analysis and Evaluation, Research and
Engineering, and Comptroller.
• Cost-effective force trade-offs, cross-Service balance, and mutual support.
- Lead Offices : Performance Analysis and Evaluation
- In Coordination With : USD/P, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics,
Research and Engineering, Comptroller
• Cross-program, modernization, Research and Development
- Lead Offices : Performance Analysis and Evaluation
- In Coordination With : Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence, Policy Review, Comptroller, other OSD as appropriate.
• Readiness, sustainability, other logistics
- Lead Offices : Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
- In Coordination With : USD/P, Performance Analysis and Evaluation,
Research and Engineering.
• Manpower program feasibility and efficiency
- Lead Office : Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
- In Coordination With : USD/P, Performance Analysis and Evaluation,
Comptroller.
• Budget Review; Cost Savings and Added Efficiencies
• Lead Offices : Comptroller
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• In Coordination With : All of OSD, Services
*
- Research and Engineering is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, today
+ - Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics responsibilities are divided between
Production and Logistics, Force Management and Personnel, and Reserve Affairs.
In the same memorandum, former Secretary of Defense Carlucci stated the following:
. . . OSD will, with help from the Services, design and plan for additional
standardization, joint programs and joint systems, to improve efficiency and
reduce costs. . . .
OSD must help the Secretary and me manage the organization as a whole and
help us identify major problems and issues in the total system in time to act.
[Ref. 51, p. 4-6)
In the above quotes, Secretary Carlucci and Weinberger provide insight into their
utilization of OSD and perceived accountability. AYE the assignments set-up by
Secretary Carlucci and Weinberger, the accountability of the Secretary of Defense rests
in the areas of overall policy, strategy, force planning, and planning guidance; resource
objectives, planning, and guidance; fiscal guidance; program development; program
unification and standardization; program review and evaluation; and budget review, cost
savings, and added efficiencies.
OSD documents, evaluates, and facilitates the development, implementation
and establishment of defense policies, the current force structure and capabilities,
projected enhancement from programs, changes to national security strategy and
functions of DOD. In so doing, OSD looks at the proposals and activities of the
Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified/Specified Commands, Defense Agencies, and
DOD field activities at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic levels as
appropriate in order to relate them to the perspective of the Secretary of Defense.
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2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Title 10, United States Code (as amended) and DOD Directive 5100.1,
"Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components" define the roles
and missions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
a. Function of Joint Chiefs of Staff
AFSC Pub 1 summarizes the function of the JCS as follows:
"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to
the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman is responsible for the principal functions listed below:
• Strategic Direction
- furnish strategic direction of the Armed Forces
• Strategic Planning
- prepare strategic plans
- prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans
- perform net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed Forces
Contingency Planning
- provide for preparation and review of contingency plans
- advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities
• Requirements, Programs, and Budget
- advise on the priorities of requirements
- advise on program recommendations and budget proposals
- assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs
• Doctrine, Training, and Education
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- develop doctrine for joint employment
- formulate policies for coordinating military education and training
Other Matters
- exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff
- as directed by the President, attend and participate in meetings of the NSC
- advise and assist the National Command Authority on establishing
combatant commands
- transmit communications between the National Command Authority and
combatant commands
- review plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility
- as the Chairman considers appropriate, consults with and seeks the advice
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders.
The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is organic and mission oriented. Their view is
driven toward the overall organization, readiness and capabilities during peace time
and performance during war. [Ref. 52, p. 35]
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 sets the JCS
Chairman as the head of the JCS and assigned to the Chairman duties previously
belonging to the corporate body of the JCS . Therefore, the Chairman is the principal
military adviser to the National Command Authority. By placing the corporate
responsibility of the JCS under the Chairman, the Congress and National Command
Authority demand joint advise and decisions oriented toward what is good for the
nation, and then, what is good for the service. Prior to the Act. the judgment of the
JCS's effectiveness was very difficult because the representative of the service was dual
hatted and the JCS recommendations were weakened by their concern for a consensus.
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[Ref. 53, p. 69] Their dual-hatted status led to a perception that they met in the JCS
with the perspective to protect their service as well as the national interest. Although
protecting the service and national interest are compatible to a certain degree, there are
foreseeable situations where they are not. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act
gave to the Chairman the authority, responsibility, and accountability for the actions of
the JCS being in the national interest.
Also, the Act increased the scope of the JCS statutory duties in each
of the functional areas and the capabilities of the JCS. The capabilities of the JCS
were enhanced tremendously with the creation of the Directorate for Operational Plans
and Interoperability (J-7) and the Directorate for Force Structure, Resource and
Assessment Directorate (J-8). In John M. Collins' book, U.S. Defense Planning: A
Critique , the JCS is described as not being "organized to connect those (strategic) plans
with programs and budgets." [Ref. 53, p. 69] The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides an
organization for the connection of programs and budgets to strategic plans.
b. Organization
The organization of the JCS is composed of the following:
• The JCS consisting of:
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
• Chief of Staff Army;
Chief of Staff Air Force;
Chief of Naval Operations; and
• Commandant of the Marine Corps.
• Assisted by the following:
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• Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the Director of
the Joint Staff (as Chairman). Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Navy Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, and Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and
• Deputy Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the
Deputy Director of the Joint Staff (as Chairman) and a two-star flag or general
officer from each service. [Ref. 52, p. 36]
• The Joint Staff includes:
• The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
• The Office of the Director of the Joint Staff;
• Secretary of the Joint Staff;
Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-l);
Operations Directorate (J-3);
• Logistics Directorate (J-4);
• Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5);
Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (J-6);
• Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7);
Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8);
Directorate for Information and Resource Management (DIRM);
• Adviser for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support;
• Office of the Inspector General.
c. Effectiveness of the JCS
The effectiveness of the JCS is historically judged by the performance
of the military during crisis, conflict, and warfare, however the Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act directs a broader scope for the evaluation of the JCS's
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effectiveness. The performance of the military during crisis, conflict, and warfare will
always provide the best possible information for judging the JCS's effectiveness, but
the cost of crisis, conflicts, and warfare is horrendous and unacceptable and our
national security strategy remains to deter as long as the elements of national power
are maintained.
Nevertheless, the emphasis of the nation today is on the activities
surrounding the preparedness of the military for crisis, conflict, and warfare. To look
at a particular crisis, conflict, or war is very dangerous because each incident is unique
and the circumstances surrounding it can never be recaptured or duplicated. Therefore,
the functionings of the JCS which worked in one crisis, conflict or war situation may
not work in the next. In this environment, the JCS is evaluated on the perceived
thoroughness of "joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures" found in
the joint publications; the perceived accuracy of identified critical deficiencies and
strengths in force capabilities and their effect on meeting national security objectives;
and ability to look beyond a parochial view of programs, resource allocations, and
operations and make the tough decisions or choices between alternative policies, plans,
doctrine, and advise which is best for national security. [Ref. 52, pp. 85-98]
The Director, JCS J-7, has responsibility for the Joint Publication
System. The functional series structure of the joint publication system is organized
as follows:
• Series, Capstone Joint Warfare Doctrine - links joint doctrine to national
strategy and the contributions of other government agencies and alliances.
Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) continues to establish the basic
organization and command and control relationships for effective joint
operations.
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• 1 Series, Joint Reference Publications - includes publication guide and index
and general reference publications.
• 2 Series, Doctrine for Intelligence Support - establishes the joint doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence support, including direction,
planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.
• 3 Series, Doctrine for Joint Operations - establishes the joint doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and executing joint
operations.
• 4 Series, Doctrine for Logistics Support - establishes the joint doctrine,
techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and carrying out logistics
support of joint operations.
• 5 Series, Doctrine for Joint Operations - establishes joint planning processes
relating to the conduct of joint military operations.
• 6 Series, Doctrine for C3 Systems Support of Joint Operations - establishes
joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for C3 systems support to
joint operations. [Ref. 52, pp. 86-87]
Through the development of publications under the above series, the JCS is setting
"joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures."
The Goldwater-Nichols Act directs the JCS to make realistic
assessments in their plans, policies, and doctrine that take into account the limitation
of resources, politics, and military capabilities.
The JCS uses different versions of memorandums to communicate
policies, instructions, and recommendations to the outside world.
3. DOD Agencies and DOD Field Activities
The DOD agencies and field activities have about 86,000 personnel and
control about six percent of the DOD budget.
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a. DOD Agencies
When discussions surface about the DOD force structure, the DOD
agencies are frequently overlooked. The Secretary of Defense in creating the defense
agencies and maintaining or adding functions to the defense agencies makes his
decision on believed improvements in "economy, effectiveness, and efficiency in the
Defense Department and the inability of the military services to agree on common
procedures." [Ref. 54, p. 5] The Antonelli Report provides the best overview of the
defense agencies and categorizes the agencies as follows:
• Support of the operating forces
• Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
• Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
• Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
• National Security Agency (NSA)
• Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)*
• Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)*
• Staff support
• Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
• Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
• Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)*
• Audit and investigation
• Defense Audit Service (DAS)
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Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
*
- The Antonelli Report did not include this agency, [ref 54, p. 17]
Dr. Archie D. Barrett in Reappraising Defense Organization states that
The agencies were created to eliminate the duplication which occurs when four
separate services perform the same function. A defense agency consolidates the
performance of a common function previously performed by more than one
service. [Ref. 55, p. 73]
Dr. Barrett also discusses and cites other sources which express
concerns over the agencies impact on the Secretary of Defense span of control. The
Secretary reduces the impact of the defense agencies by assigning the appropriate level
of supervisory responsibility to closely related staff sections in OSD and/or the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. DOD Field Activities
In the Senate Armed Services' Staff Report titled, "Defense
Organization: The Need For Change," the eight DOD field activities are described as
performing "selected support and service functions of a more limited scope than
Defense Agencies ." [Ref. 56, p. 73]
C. LINES OF COMMAND
The two primary lines of command available to the National Command Authority
are the Departments and the Unified/Specified Commands. The Departments have the
mission to maintain and strengthen the force. The Unified/Specified Commands have
the mission to employ the force.
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1. The Departments
a. The Department of the Army
The Department of the Army is responsible for maintaining and
strengthening the ability of land forces to fight and win the land, land-air, and space
battle in a joint and coalition environment throughout the spectrum of conflict. The
land forces include the reserve and active components. The organization chart shown
in Figure 1 1 depicts the location of the Department of the Army in the organization
for "common defence."
b. The Department of the Navy
The Department of the Navy is responsible for maintaining and
strengthening the ability of amphibious and sea forces to fight and win the sea, air,
space, and land battle in a joint and coalition environment throughout the spectrum
of conflict. The Department of the Navy includes the Navy and Marine Corps. The
amphibious and sea forces include reserve and active components. The location of the
Department of the Navy in the organization for "common defence" is depicted in
Figure 1 1
.
c. The Department of the Air Force
The Department of the Air Force is responsible for maintaining and
strengthening the ability of the air forces to fight and win the air, space, and air-land
battle in a joint and coalition environment throughout the spectrum of conflict. The
Department of the Air Force includes reserve and active components. The location
of the Department of the Air Force in the organization for "common defence" is
depicted in Figure 1 1
.
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2. Unified and Specified Command
General George Marshall stated during early days of World War II that:
I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater -
air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are
such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops
under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would
solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single
command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do
not do this. [Ref. 57, p. 455]
The realization for the need of unified commands by the American people took root
during and after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The land, air, and sea based weapon
systems have tremendous range and the weapon system of either land, air, sea
environment may easily impact battle being conducted in another environment.
The National Security Act of 1947 established the Unified and Specified
Commands. Over the years, the names of some commands have changed; some
commands have been joined with another command and lost its self identity; but the
role of a unified or specified command remains constant. Their respective definition
is as follows:
Unified Combatant Command is a command with a broad continuing mission
under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of
two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the
President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 58, p. 3-21]
Specified Combatant Command is a command which has broad, continuing
missions and that is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense
with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is
normally composed of forces from but one Service. [Ref. 58, p. 3-29]
110
The chain of command flows from the National Command Authority to the Unified and
Specified Combatant Commanders. DOD Directive 5100.1, paragraph B.2.c. states the
following about the chain of command for the combatant commanders:
c. The Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands are
responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the
military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over
forces assigned to them as directed by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to
section 10 U.S.C. 164 reference (d)). The operational chain of command runs
from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified
and Specified Combatant Commands. The Chairman, JCS functions within the
chain of command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Unified and
Specified Combatant Commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of
Defense.
(1) Orders to such commanders shall be issued by the President or the
Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman, JCS with the authority and direction
of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
(2) Communications from the President or the Secretary or the Secretary of
Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands,
shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS. Communications from the
Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to the President
and/or the Secretary of Defense shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS.
(3) Communications in matters of joint interest, addressed to the Commanders
of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands by other authority, shall,
unless urgent circumstances do not permit, be coordinated with the Chairman,
JCS. Information copies of all communications in matters of joint interest
between Washington level offices, agencies, activities and commands and the
Unified and Specified Combatant Commands shall be provided to the Chairman,
JCS.
(4) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman acts as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and
Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of
their commands and shall be responsible for overseeing the activities of the
combatant commands. The President and the Secretary of Defense may assign
other duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense
in performing their command function. [Ref. 49, pp. 2-3]
The Unified Commands are:
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to:
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM);
U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM);
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM);
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM);
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM);
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM);
U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM); and
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM);
The Specified Combatant Commands are the following:
Forces Command (FORSCOM); and
Strategic Air Command (SAC).
The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 grants to the CINCs the authority
give authoritative direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of
military operations, joint training, and logistics;
prescribe the chain of command within the command;
organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions;
employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions;
coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline; and
exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command
staff. [Ref. 52, p. 44]
The authority used by the CINC is referred to as Operational Command (OPCOM)
or Operational Control (OPCON). JCS Pub 0-2, UNAAF defines these types of
authority. The definition of operational command is as follows:
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OPCOM is the authority to perform those functions of command involving the
composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives,
and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCOM includes
directive authority for logistics and joint training. OPCOM should be exercised
through the commanders of assigned normal organizational units or through the
commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising
OPCOM. OPCOM provides full authority to organize forces as the operational
commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions, and to retain or
delegate operational control or tactical control as necessary. OPCOM does not,
of itself, include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization,
and unit training. OPCOM is exercised solely by the commanders of unified and
specified commands. [Ref. 58, p. 3-9]
The definition of OPCON is basically the same except for the following:
• It is used by levels of the command below the unified or specified combatant
commander.
• It is authority delegated to a commander but "limited by function, time, or
location." [Ref. 58, p. 3-9]
3. Line of Command Relationship Between the Departments and
Combatant Commanders
The mutually dependent relationship between the Departments and the
Combatant Commanders is crucial to the performance of the DOD. The maintenance
and strengthening processes of the departments include training, equipping,
administering, sustaining, and preparing the forces to fight, but they do not employ the
forces during the fight. All line forces within the services are OPCOM to one of the
Combatant Commanders who have the responsibility for the employment of the forces
throughout the spectrum of warfare.
The success of the Combatant Commanders is totally dependent upon the
processes of maintaining and strengthening the forces capability to fight and deter
within each Department. This dependency is becoming more and more critical as
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technology continues to shape and re-shape modern warfare. It is not a helpless
dependency as some may have argued prior to the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act of 1986 which gave authority to National Command Authority to
modify the authority balance. The Departments still control the money, but the CINCs
have authority and influence over their activities which may impact his ability to
employ the forces. In order for the system to work, the Combatant Commanders must
successfully exercise the appropriate authoritative direction over the activities of the
Departments.
D. THE INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEMS WITHIN THE DOD
Taking from the analysis provided in AFSC Pub 1, there are five major internally
institutionalized systems that govern C2 within the DOD. They are:
• Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),
• Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS),
• The Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS),
• The DOD Acquisition System, and
• Information System*.
*
- AFSC Pub 1 includes NSC System and Worldwide Military Command and Control
and not the Information System. [Ref. 52]
1. PPBS
The PPBS is the overall system within the DOD used for documenting the
projected optimal allocation of resources for a targeted fiscal year. As the name
implies, the system involves three distinct, but interrelated phases/processes. They are
the planning, programming, and budgeting phases/processes. The PPBS system has a
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fantastic audit trail which links all resource allocation to realistic defense strategy and
plans that are traceable to national security strategy in theory.
Through the PPBS process the DOD establishes an overall plan, program,
and budget for itself on an annual basis. All DOD organizations participate in the
PPBS and feel some impact from its results. LTC Mel Stinnett in his article, the A-
B-Cs of PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) states that "The
Defense Review Board serves as a corporate review body for the Secretary of Defense
in each phase of the process." [Ref. 59, pp. 1 and 3] The success of the PPBS
process depends upon the quality of external products from the formulation of national
security strategy, budget guidance from CBO and OMB, threat estimates from
intelligence community, JSPS, and JOPS.
a. The Planning Phase
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has lead responsibility for
the development of the planning phase in PPBS. The audit trail for this phase goes
as follows:
• Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) - provides a plan for measuring
the effectiveness of Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submissions.
The JSPD states the "comprehensive military appraisal of threat world-wide,
recommended national military objectives, policy appraisal and
recommendations, . . . planning force levels . . ., and attainability of those
forces based on resource constraint." [Ref. 60, p.35)
• National Security Study Directive (NSSD) and National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) - are the Presidents statements of national purpose, policy,
objectives, and strategy submined to the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 52, p.
107]
• Draft Policy Guidance - comes from the Secretary of Defence for input or
direction on the JSPD. [Ref 52, p. 107]
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• Strategy and Options Review - is held by the Secretary of Defense for the
purpose of developing stategy and options for presentation to the President.
IRef. 52, p. 107J
• Strategy and Option Decision - is the decision of the President on the strategy
and Options. [Ref. 52, p. 107]
• Defense Guidance (DG)- "defines the threat against which DOD programs are
measured; states national and defense policy, objectives, and strategy; provides
resource and forces guidance and establishes the fiscal guidelines for the
upcoming programming phase." [Ref. 61, p. 366] The Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy chairs and leads the Steering Group that drafts the DG for
the Secretary of Defense approval.
The publication of the Defense Guidance (DG) culminates the planning phase. The
Defense Resource Board oversees the planning process to ensure that the DG published
and distributed in a timely manner. The audit trail of this phase is more than adequate
and touches all bases for development. The major actors in the establishment of
national security strategy and defense strategy and policy have their chance for input
and participation.
b. Programming Phase
During the programming phase of PPBS, the DOD tries to establish
the program for the next five years which will optimize the chances of fulfilling the
DG in an environment of limited resources. LTC Mel Stinnett in his article, the A-
B-Cs of PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) states that "The
purpose of the programming phase is to structure resources (forces and personnel) by
mission in order to achieve the objectives established in the DG." [Ref. 59, p. 3] The
participants in this phase are the Services, Defense Agencies, OSD, Defense Resource
Board (DRB), and JCS.
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The documentation of this phase includes:
• DG - see planning phase definition of DG. The DG is the starting point for
the programming phase.
• Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) - provides the programs for the
next five years that the service departments and defense agencies believe
necessary to optimize chances of accomplishing DG. [Ref. 60, p. 13]
• Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) - an assessment of whether
the programs under the POM will fulfill requirements in JSPD. [Ref. 59, p.
5]
• Issue Book - is a review of the service and defense agencies proposal by
OSD, the JCS, other departments, and the OMB for issues on capabilities,
cost, and resourcing. The issues are grouped into the following areas: policy
and risk assessment, nuclear forces, conventional forces, modernization and
investment, readiness and other logistics, manpower, intelligence, and
management initiatives. [Ref. 52, p. 109] The DRB researches these issues
to make recommendation for solution of issues.
• Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) - is the Secretary of Defense's
decision on the service and defense agencies programs. [Ref. 61, p. 368]
The PDM is the last document of this phase.
c. The Budgeting Phase.
The budgeting phase is the process of estimating cost in order to obtain
resource funding for the targeted fiscal year. The documents of this phase include:
• POM
• PDM
• Budget Estimate Submission (BES) - is prepared by each Service and defense
agency for cost of programs. [Ref. 59, p. 6]
• Program Budget Decisions fPBDs) - is the budget proposal which results from
the joint review by OSD, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and
OMB. [Ref. 59, p. 6]
• President's Budget (PB) - is the budget proposal submitted by the President
to Congress. [Ref. 60, p. 35]
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This is the translation of forecasts into needed resources.
2. The JSPS.
The JSPS is the set processes used by the Joint Staff to fulfill the following
functions:
• its strategic direction,
• strategic planning,
• requirements, programs, and budget, and
• review of plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility.
The JSPS has an institutionalized documentation process which includes:
• Essential Elements of Information (EEI) - an input from the CINCs to the
JCS J-2, DIA, of the information needed for an update on the threat. [Ref. 52,
p. 104]
• Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (TPSP) - on the basis of EEI and
other input from CINCs, services, DOD staff, and the Joint Staff, the J-2 drafts
for the chairman approval the military intelligence requirements and priorities
to be filled by the intelligence community. [Ref. 52, p. 104]
• Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) - on the basis of intelligence
gathered to meet IPSP requirements an estimate is made for the targeted
budget year and nine years afterwards. [Ref. 52, p. 105]
• Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA) - JSPDSA
I provides national military objectives, strategy, and planning guidance and
tasks the CINCS for their input to follow on documents; JSPDSA II is the
CINCS estimate of the minimum risk force; and JSPDSA III is the planning
force level needed to achieve national strategy. [Ref. 52, pp. 105-106]
• JSPD - was discussed as a document under the planning phase of PPBS.
• Joint Security Assessment Memorandum (JSAM) - is an annual assessment
of the security assistance program submitted by the Department of State. [Ref.
52, p. 108]
• JPAM - was discussed as a document under the program phase of PPBS.
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• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - provides the military task guidance
to each service department and combatant commander for a two year period.
The JSCP is published every other year and may be modified if significant
changes occur during the off year. The JSCP "apportions major combat forces
to the combatant commanders." From the received guidance, the CINCs
develop operational plans in support of the national security strategy. [Ref. 52,
p. 111-112]
The success of the system is vital to the translation of National Security Strategy and
defense policy into viable and executable operational and contingency plans.
3. JOPS
JOPS is the system used by DOD whereby the service departments and
combatant commanders prepare plans for the execution of assigned military tasks.
The assigned military tasks may come from JSCP or directly from the National
Command Authority or JCS. The service departments and combatant commanders
develop procedures for deliberate or crisis planning conditions. The guidance and
procedures for JOPS are found in the following:
• JCS Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures);
• JCS Pub 5-02.2, JOPS Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance);
• JCS Pub 5-02.3, JOPS Volume IJJ (ADP Support); and
• JCS Pub 5-02.4, JOPS Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures). [Ref. 52, pp.
121-123]
During JOPS, the planners are required to exercise great judgment in
estimating the expected environment for the execution of the operational plan.
Knowledge is needed on every aspect of the environment. This knowledge is very
extensive and covers the capabilities, limitations, and doctrine of friendly and opposing
forces at the technical, tactical, operational, theater, and strategic levels of warfare; the
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presence and expected arrival of friendly and opposing forces; and psychological
strength of the opposing force.
The documentation of preparations under JOPS to meet military taskings is
normally Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDS).
4. The Defense Acquisition System.
The Department of Defense Acquisition System is a technostructure
implanted throughout DOD to ensure that the combatant commanders have the best
feasible mix of weaponry and other equipment to win the war throughout the spectrum
and whether it is waged at the technical, tactical, operational, theater, or strategic level.
The best feasible mix was selected based on affordability to the nation, operational
capability, applied technology limitations, managerial efficiency, defense industry
workmanship, and moral values. These trade-offs and limiters are considered and
placed on the acquisition system.
Guidance for Defense Acquisition Systems are found in the following
documents:
• OMB Circular NO. A- 109 to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Establishments, subjected "Major System Acquisitions."
• DOD Directive 5000.1, subjected: "Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition
Programs."
• DOD Instruction 5000.2, subjected: "Defense Acquisition Program Procedures."
• DOD Directive 5134.1, subjected: "Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)."




These documents set policies and procedures for the acquisition of systems within the
DOD along with the managerial structure and guidelines.
5. Information Systems.
The DOD employs the information systems to enhance the decision makers
capability to make the right decisions from the National Command Authority on down.
An information system is "a person/machine arrangement of components that interact
to support the operational, managerial, and decision-making information needs of an
organization." [Ref. 62, p. 39]
The decision makers, today, face the age old problems of employing military
art better than our adversary. However, the environment presents new complexities
because:
• the national interests are so pervasive that a large and strong military is
needed;
• the force is dispersed over extensive geographical areas that include space,
land, air, sea, and submerged based elements;
• the weapons have global range, phenomenal accuracy, unbelievable lethality,
and abundance of numbers; and
• the potential pace of resource expenditure during warfare.
Therefore, the decision maker has a very compressed decision cycle, timewise.
However, the large volume of information and dispersed sources of information makes
the decision cycle extremely difficult to compress. The decision maker's ability to
wage modem warfare at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic level is
impaired by the compressed decision cycle, information volume, and dispersion of
information sources. Bad decisions in this environment are potentially unforgivable.
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With the compressed decision cycle, disperse information sources, and
information volume the decision makers ability to scope has been improved by the
information system which consists of the following elements:
• the staff,
• the communication systems,
• the automation systems, and
• the information requirements.
The elements of the information system help the decision maker to minimize the
uncertainty in his perception of the current situation and explore the pros and cons of
alternative courses of action for accomplishing the mission.
From the National Command Authority downward there are staff sections
of varying sizes responsible for the efficient operations of the information systems. A
staff section may have a technical, operational, and/or managerial orientation.
a. Information Requirements and Joint Reporting Structure
The information requirements identify the necessary information to be
passed vertically and horizontally in the command and the frequency that the
information should be updated in order to coordinate the employment and maintenance
of the military force. The formulation of efficient and effective information
requirements is crucial to the timely flow of pertinent operational, logistical,
administrative, security, and intelligence information in support of decision making
throughout the force organization. The information requirement influences the decisions
on staff, communication systems, and automation systems support and design.
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The system for designing an information flow from the technical level
to the National Command Authority is the Joint Reporting System (JRS). JCS
Publication 6 defines the purpose for the JRS as follows:
• National Command Authority need for military information to perform its
functions.
• The JRS participants need for a central catalogue of recurring reporting
requirements used to support command decisions regarding military operations
and to rninimize duplicative reporting.
• The general need for standardization in reporting systems, to the maximum
extent possible, of the JCS, Services, and DOD agencies.
• The need for central management and standard rules regarding the application
of message text formatting to reporting systems. [Ref. 63, p. 2-1]
Throughout the chain of command, an evaluation of the unit's current status is very
important to C2. The range of information needed throughout the chain of command
is extensive. There are conditions where the employment of micro-management is
most appropriate as well as other conditions necessitating macro-management by the
National Command Authority.
In crisis situation and low intensity conflict, the National Command
Authority may select to micro-manage the situation because of the situation's political
sensitivity. In this case, the chain of command from the involved unit or ship to the
JCS needs the most accurate information in order to give the best advise to the
National Command Authority. All decision makers need knowledge of the capabilities
and limitations of their force being committed in a certain environment.
In formulating the military strategy of global or theater scope, the
National Command Authority needs the best information possible for reaching its
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decisions. In this particular case, the decision maker performs a macro-management
function. Again, the recommendations of appropriate commanders and the JCS are
sought. Their recommendations need to be based on the current capabilities and
limitation of the military force, globally or theater-wide in the current environment.
The JRS provides insight to the services, operational commands, JCS,
and applicable agencies of information considered important for reporting. The
services, operational commands, and applicable agencies use the JRS as a reference
point for implementing their own reporting procedures. [Ref. 64, p. 3]
The JRS depends upon the units and ships being honest about their
status and other reports. There is potential integrity problems with such a system if
the unit decision maker or responsible staff personnel foresee the potential for
unfavorable action being taken toward the unit or himself if a status or condition is
reported honestly. Military ethics requires personnel to place the welfare of the unit
or ship above personal motivations.
b. The Staff
The staff is a functional division of the personnel dedicated to the
organizational role of supporting the operational, managerial, and decision-making
information needs. The staff supporting the upper level of management are generally
more specialized than the lower levels. The decision maker and staff relationship is
present throughout the C2 hierarchy of the defense organization.
There are many disciplines and subdisciplines employed by the staff
in order to reach their best possible recommendation. The disciplines include
automation, operational analysis, mathematics, military art, physics, management, and
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others. Some subdisciplines employed by the staff in the area of automation include
data base management, software engineering, computer programming, computer
graphics, and others.
c. The Communication Systems
The communication systems are electronic means of gathering
intelligence information from electronic signatures and passing voice and data
information over dispersed locations. The communication systems enable the decision
maker to receive information from dispersed information sources. The United States
has a variety of communications systems supporting the mission of the force at the
technical, tactical, operational, and strategic levels of combat. For each
communications system, there exists a different mix of performance requirements as
listed in figure 12.
a. supportability b. operability
c. maintainability d. survivability
e. operational capability f. transportability




k. durability 1. data compatibility
Figure 12. Possible Performance Requirement for
Communications System
The Defense Acquisition System has the tough responsibility of fielding communication
systems that comply with technical and operational requirements. The lines of
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command have the responsibility for designating the features required for each
communication system.
d. The Automation Systems
The automation systems are designed for the following:
• to improve information processing, storage, accuracy and retrieval;
• to control and maybe perform very precise and repetitive functions;
• to perform data manipulation, graphical display, analysis and other types of
decision aids; and
• to expedite information transfer.
With automation systems, the staff and decision maker have enhance ability to handle
and filter the large volume of information and produce the estimates and
recommendations on the alternative courses of actions.
E. FUNCTIONALITY OF THIS LEVEL IN C2
The functionality of force organization in C2 is a compatibility issue between
the force organization and the national security interests, objectives, policy, and
strategy. The military force organization is operationally employed to implement
national security strategy, under the constraints of national security policy, and to
accomplish the national security objective. The force organization is a broad statement
of the military objectives, policy, and strategy. In the force organization, there exists
the real capabilities and limitations of the military force.
Three very basic questions are required to determine the functionality of this
level in C2. They are:
• Has the U.S. current force organization managed to deter war?
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• Can the U.S. current force organization fight and accomplish the national
security objective of our next low intensity conflict, conventional warfare, and
nuclear warfare?
• Can the U.S. continue to efficiently and effectively maintain and strengthen
the military force capability to accomplish national security objectives in the
face of the advancement in technology development, the human ability to
grasp the utilizations of high tech and very destructive weaponry, and resource
constraints?
The answer to all three rests in the military force ability to effectively function at the





This level of the Williams Model for the military role in C2 covers the methods
used by:
• the military departments to maintain and strengthen their forces and
• the Combatant Commanders to be operationally prepared for employing the
forces (See Figure 13).
In this chapter, we shall look at a conceptual overview of combat readiness,
doctrine development, the role of training and indoctrination, sustainability, program
development, and evaluation of the military's combat readiness.
B. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF COMBAT READINESS
Combat readiness is an important factor in the ability of the military to deter or
fight in order to meet or secure the national security objectives. The force structure,
division of functions, responsibility, and authority, and institutionalized systems have
provided the broad military objectives, policy, and strategy. The DOD has
implemented some very sound managerial measures to ensure that the output of the
established military objectives, formulated military policy, and implemented military
strategy is combat readiness. These managerial measures contribute immensely to the
C2 over the military role in "Common Defence." During the preparation for combat
readiness, the military strategy is divided and subdivided until all the technical tasks
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Figure 13. Level Six of the Williams Model for C2
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The technical level covers the preparation of the individual and the small weapon
teams for their jobs and the functioning of equipment. At the technical level, the U.S.
prepares, as well as feasible under resource constraints, the force organizations for all
foreseeable and feasible environments. The personnel learn the operational function on
how to apply the weaponry against the opposing force and the managerial skills and
staff functions for the mission accomplishment. The equipment is designed, developed,
produced, fielded, purchased, and/or operated for operational requirements which are
supported by a validated mission. Deterrence depends upon the combat readiness of
the U.S. military. An element of combat readiness is the willingness and capability
of the American people to apply its military force at the technical level so effectively
that the opposing force stands practically no chance of accomplishing desired political,
economic, ideological, military, technological, or other advantages.
Since the fight of David and Goliath, the outcome of military conflict has
seldomly been determined by the outcome of a single conflict at the technical level,
so the C2 of the military force is geared toward tactical, campaign, and strategic levels
of warfare. At the tactical, campaign, and strategic level, the force organization
ensures that the military force is integrated and ready, as one, mentally, operationally,
logistically, technically, administratively, and intelligence-wise to deter and, if required,
to fight for the accomplishment of the national security objectives. Functional and
performance shortfalls in the above areas limit the C2 capacity of the Commander on
the battlefield or the President and the CINCs from their command posts. RB 101-
999, Staff Officers' Handbook
,
published by the U.S. Army defines the principles of
war as follows:
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Objective. Every military operation should be directed towards a clearly
defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
Economy of force. Allocate minimum-essential combat power to secondary
efforts.
Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the dynamic
application of combat power.
Unity of Command. For every objective, there should be unity of effort under
one responsible commander.
Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time and/or place where he is unprepared.
Simplicity. Prepared clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders for
thorough understanding. [Ref. 65, pp. 3-1 and 3-2]
The military force must be able to apply the principles of war when it performs the
technical tasks assigned to an individual or group; the tactical and campaign tasks
assigned to units or ships; and the strategic mission in a coherent manner.
The military departments, JCS, and combatant commands divide the battlefield
preparation functions (operation/maneuver, administrative, security, logistic, and
intelligence) into tasks and subtasks until the military strategy reaches those tasks
performed at the technical level. In the orchestration of warfare at the tactical,
campaign, and strategic levels, there are information requirements in support of the
battlefield preparation functions which flow from higher to lower commands and from
lower to higher commands to support the task held at a certain level. The culmination
of the planning stage of the battlefield preparation function is the commander's concept
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for orchestration of the activities by friendly and opposing forces influencing his
mission accomplishment. The commander's instruments on the battlefield are his
operational/maneuver, fire support, combat service support, intelligence/electronic
warfare, and air defense capabilities. He employs these instruments during warfare in
accordance with his concept to obtain the optimum effect upon the opposing force.
The optimum is tough to define for modem warfare. The total destruction of an
enemy in the pure sense may seem the optimum but may not be the optimum action
if such action may cause an equally destructive retaliatory response or draw others in
the rank of the opposing force.
The military attempts to standardize the basic capability of all like forces,
equipment, procedures, and personnel of the same grade and specialty at the technical
level to obtain performance consistency, economies of scale, and ease of C2. Through
the standardization effort, a commander may give clear and concise orders which the
subordinate may understand.
The end product of preparing the military force for their role in national security
strategy is combat readiness.
C. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT
Doctrine development is the process of developing stringent and not so stringent
guidelines for the implementation of current military strategy. The doctrine
development process involves the formulation of guidance for the conduct of military
operations during war and peace. Previously, the author discussed the Joint Publication
System, JOPS. and DOD Directives and Instructions which are four of many types of
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doctrine development efforts. Some other types of doctrine development efforts are the
following:
• Regulations - "are authoritative rules dealing with the details of procedures"
[Ref. 26, p. 722] for various military operations.
• Manuals - are documents which provide the procedures for the operation or
maintenance of equipment or concept of operations for a type of unit.
• Order - is "a communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys
instructions from a superior to a subordinate." [Ref. 5, p. 266]
• Operation Order - is "a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to
subordinate commanders for the purpose of affecting the coordinated execution
of an operation." [Ref. 5, p. 264]
• An establishment - is "the table setting out the authorized number of men
and major equipment in a unit/formation sometimes called "table of
organization or "Table of Organization and Equipment" (TOE). [Ref. 5, p. 134]
• Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) - describes the standard procedures for
operations, administration support, logistic, and security within the unit.
• Standard Operation and Regulation Manual - describes the standard function
of each duty position on the various ships.
• Captain Standing Order - is a document explaining the operations procedures
on a particular ship.
• Staff Action Type Papers such as the Staff Study, Decision Paper, Talking
Paper, Information Paper, Memorandum, and Military and Nonmilitary Letters.
Through these documents, the Commander or Captain sets the guidelines for mission
accomplishment within the unit or ship and exercises control over the action of
subordinates. The amount of control is reflected in the expressed specificity of the
document and tends to vary with the situation and nanire of the subject maner Except
for orders and operation orders, these documents are changeable under the current
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system and offers an opportunity for exception to policy. There is a document which
covers every aspect of military life.
D. TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION
Training and indoctrination is the method used to perpetuate military art in the
current environment which poses a dynamic situation. The military from day to day
is never the same because personnel turnover is constant, new systems and equipment
are constantly being fielded, and doctrine is evolving. The military uses training and
indoctrination as one means to maintain the combat readiness of the force organization.
Training in the military begans at the technical level and progresses to the strategic
level.
Training is a very serious activity in the military. For most training, there is a
minimal level of proficiency which must be accomplished for successful completion or
before an evaluation is made on the performance. The military views failure to obtain
the minimal standard, unfavorably. The careers of service personnel are determined by
these evaluations.
1. Technical Training of Individuals and Small Weapon Systems Team
Technical training is the start point for all training in the military.
Technical training involves the development of personnel proficiency as prescribed in
the following areas:
• individually operated weapons,
• individual job task performance,
• weapon systems operation,
• repair, maintenance, and/or operations of equipment,
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steps in pre-set procedures,
common task skills of soldier, sailor, airmen, or marine,
tactics,
managerial and technical skills for job or grade, and
physical fitness.
A soldier or marine receives technical training in the classroom and unit; a sailor in
the classroom and ship or squadron; and an airmen in the classroom and squadron.
The training may consists of hand-ons, lecture type, on the job, and simulation training.
Technical training is the process employed by the DOD to ensure that a
person with the essential basic skills is filling DOD positions. This philosophy is
practiced from grade E-l to O-10. It is through the process of learning and practicing
that the individual or small group becomes proficient in skills to be performed during
war and peace.
Technical training becomes important during wartime because it reduces
the required information to be passed during war. If the Captain of a ship is assigned
a mission to a distant port, the originator of the mission provides the Captain with
general guidelines for the mission performance, but does not have to tell the details of
operating and managing the ship. By the same token, if a Brigade Commander in the
Army is assigned a mission to defend a certain location, the originator of the mission
provides the Commander with general guidelines for the mission performance, but does
not have to tell the details of commanding the Brigade.
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2. Training of Tactical Forces
Tactical training is the process of learning how to employ two or more
non-nuclear weapon systems in a battle. Operational training is the process of learning
how to employ two or more units, ships, squadrons, etc. in a series of battles. Tactical
and operational training focuses on the employment of combined arms. Generally,
wars are fought and won during decisive tactical and operational battles of strategic
importance. The Battle at Midway and the Battle of the Bulge were such a battle.
Tactical training is normally performed with a single or multiple unit(s), ship(s),
squadron(s), etc. The Army uses the National Training Centers for realistic battalion
level tactical training. The Navy goes to sea on Refresher Training and has the Top
Gun School at Miramar Navy Air Station. The training of air units is normally
captured by the average number of flying hours. The performance of tank elements
in the military is usually captured by the average mileage per tank and gunnery
qualification.
During major exercises held by the CINCs or Service Components, the
services perform Tactical and Campaign type training using joint and maybe combined
doctrine. Campaign training is very expensive and is not conducted too often. To
make up for the shortage of live training, the services and CINCs hold Command Post
Exercises (CPX) and run/play different simulation and model war games.
3. Training of Strategic Forces
The training of strategic forces is normally conducted via the nuclear test
program and during JCS directed exercises. Policy Paper 5: Nuclear Weapons Testing
,
by the U.S. Department of Energy, dated January 1987, stated the following:
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• Our security and that of the Free World depend on deterrence.
• For deterrence to work, potential aggressors must be convinced that we have
the capability and the will to deliver a devastating response to attack on us or
on our allies.
• U.S. nuclear weapons are an essential part of deterrence.
• Nuclear weapons must be tested to remain safe, reliable, effective, and
survivable. [Ref. 66, p. 1747]
As Policy Paper 5 reflects, the test program is crucial to the combat readiness of the
nuclear force.
The JCS has several exercises that involve the utilization of tactical forces
in strategic level activities and the testing of different aspects of procedures set for
the nuclear related force.
4. Indoctrination
Indoctrination is the process of teaching the U.S. military code of ethics to
the military personnel. The U.S. military code of ethics provides the expected behavior
of military personnel during war and peace. The military code of ethics has "duty,
honor, and country" as its basic precepts. From these basic precepts, discipline, values,
mode of operation, and/or ethics of the military system taught to new recruits and/or
arrivals are derived. Part of the needed values, discipline, and ethics is taught prior
to a person's entry on active duty by different aspects of our culture. Indoctrination
is a repetitive process which occurs over and over throughout a person's military
career. Indoctrination is very important to the military for discipline and
unquestionable, immediate obeyance of lawful orders are necessary for mission
accomplishment.
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Normally, there are set indoctrination procedures when a person first enter
on active duty and each time he or she reports to a new assignment. The military
process for indoctrination began with the oath of commissioning or enlistment. It is
followed by many classes on the Code of Conduct and Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). A person's socialization into the military depends upon the
acceptance of values, ethics, and lawful military discipline. In warfare, a person risks
the lost of his life for his country and knows that there is a strong probability that
death may come. It takes a love for country and unit for an individual to face the
challenge of death during warfare. Without this type of discipline, C2 suffers during
warfare. Past wars provide testament to the discipline and internal fortitude of active
duty military service.
E. SUSTAINABILITV
Sustainability is the ability of the nation to logistically replace elements of the
combat force attrited or expended during combat. Sustainability is complicated because
of the expected fast pace of combat and potential global lines of communications
(LOC) during future wars. The U.S. ability to sustain the force is directly influenced
by allies and U.S. success at keeping the LOC open and flowing.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV in his statement to the Senate
Armed Services Committee grouped sustainability under the following headings:
• personnel, and
• materiel.
Under materiel, the DOD is concerned with the level of munitions, spares and repair
parts, war reserve secondary items, POL, and industrial base. [Kef. 67, pp. 665-681]
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The U.S. Army relies heavily upon pre-positioned stocks. The deployment of reserve
elements and CONUS based forces will provide a substantial part of the combat,
combat support and combat service support units for sustained combat. The early
deployment of these forces is crucial for combat effectiveness.
Shortages of personnel and materiel restricts the options of the Commander or
Captain during combat.
F. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
The departments and their service(s) have responsibility for program development.
Program development involves the process for bringing together the functioning of the
acquisition, PPBS, JSPS, JOPS, and information systems in order to maintain and
strengthen the readiness of the service component. The interaction of the services'
program development with the DOD level systems is crucial to the accomplishment of
the military objective. The services must document and obtain funds for programs
which will give their service component in the operational force the capability to
conduct war in accordance with the mission requirements. The Combatant
Commanders must develop thorough, operational requirements which specify their
precise mission needs.
In many ways, the program development process is all relative to projected
strengths and developments of the threat and the U.S. technology capability. Changes
of the threat cause the friendly forces to make changes in order to maintain deterrence
capability.
To document a program, the service component must identify a projected shortfall
in their mission capability to function at the technical, tactical, operational, or strategic
139
level in the near or distant future. Two illustrations of effort to enhance mission
capability of military forces are shown below:
• the U.S. Navy is exploring the use of laser communications between satellites
and the submarine force. This improvement will benefit the operational and
strategic level utilization of the submarine force.
• the U.S. Army is researching an anti-armor weapon to counteract the reactive
armor currently used by the Soviet Union. This improvement will benefit the
technical, tactical, and operational level utilization of anti-armor weapons.
There are countless other illustrations which the author could use.
Program development includes documentation and funding to maintain and sustain
the output of the program throughout its life cycle. A program has potential to
become a problem for the units if it is not maintainable and sustainable.
G. EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES COMBAT READINESS
1. Self-Evaluation of Combat Readiness
The JRS provides the primary system for the commander and staff to report
the current status of the unit's combat readiness. The self-evaluation of combat
readiness depends heavily upon the technical capability of mid-level management
personnel in the U.S. military. Using their technical training, they provide an
assessment of the unit or ship capability to execute warfare and current status of the
personnel, training, and equipment situation.
2. Inspections, Evaluation, and Command Visits
Inspections, evaluations, and command visits provide an independent source
of information on combat readiness. In these cases, an evaluation, inspection, or
command visit team representing a higher commander accesses the performance,
readiness, and compliance with procedures, regulations, etc. of subordinate units or
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ships. They provide the higher authority an unbiased perception of a subordinate unit's
current status which is used for the rating of officers and units, setting training and




This level of the Williams Model for C2 over the military role in "Common
Defence" covers the operational performance of the U.S. military when deterrence fails
(See Figure 14). The operational performance is the orchestrated employment of the
operations/maneuver, fire support, intelligence/electronic warfare, air defense, and
combat service support elements of the military force by the commander. The military
force performs functions at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
conflict during combat. All parties in the conflict are firing real rounds of immense
lethality and their intent is to quickly impose unacceptable casualties, losses, and
destruction upon the adversary or adversaries in order to neutralize his or their
capability and will to fight before the opponent can accomplish the same against the
friendly forces.
This chapter reviews the combat environment on day one of the conflict, the
commander's preparation of the air, sea, and land battlefield, the commander's
execution of the battle plan through the employment of military art and control and
feedback loops, and the modification of the combat environment by the other levels of
the Williams Model for C2 after day one.
B. THE CREATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The ability of the U.S. to wage war is controlled tremendously by the operational
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environment. JCS Pub 1 defines the operational environment as "a composite of the
conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military
forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander." [Ref. 5, p. 263] The author
views the operational environment as the external constraints placed on the commander
that provides and limits his operational options. In accordance with the author, the
operational environment consists of the political/ideology, economic, technology,
ideology, diplomatic, geographic, and military power constraints on the employment of
the military force which all play vital C2 roles. The NCA has a responsibility to the
combatant commanders to describe these constraints whenever their military force is
employed in conflict. The NCA must understand that he defines the rules and
influences the likelihood of his operational forces winning during the conflict.
1. Political/Ideological Constraints
The political constraints limit the level of warfare and the use of
operation/maneuver and fire support elements of the force. Internal and external
sources apply political pressure on the NCA to prevent the escalation of warfare and
to obtain the speedy termination of conflict. The escalation of warfare may occur in
terms of intensity, geographical area, or type of conflict. Sometimes, the political
decision is contrary to the military decision to destroy the center gravity of the
opposing force. The Vietnam War was a classic example of the political considerations
overruling the military decisions. President Johnson decided not to request a
declaration of war from Congress which would have mobilized the nation partially
because it would have taken resources away from his "War on Poverty" domestic
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program. The speedy termination of conflict involves the reaching of a diplomatic
agreement or treaty to terminate the war.
The moral ideology of the U.S. about warfare influences the operational
execution of war. The moral ideological elements are exhibited in the officer and
enlisted oath upon signing the contract to join the military, the Code of Conduct, the
provisions of the Geneva Convention, and the willingness of the individual, military,
and country to wage war for the national security objective. Moral ideology sets the
parameters for the expected behavior in certain situations of the U.S. military during
war and peace. Ideology generally provides constraint on the operational employment
of force during warfare. The operational ideology includes an expectation that man
will be in the loop during the employment of destructive weapons.
The ideology of the conflict frequently influence the fervor by which the
friendly and opposing forces wage war. If the war evolves around the fundamental
values of a nation, the forces of that nation may be willing to accept greater losses
and fight with greater zest than their opponent(s) or allies. This aspect of the external
environment is uncontrollable. The ideology of the conflict impacts the national
support. Vietnam was a case where the American people had difficulty understanding
the purpose and basic reasons for the national involvement.
2. Economic Constraints
The economic constraints limit the capability of the U.S. to support the war.
Support includes the production and fielding of supplies, weaponry, equipment,
munitions, POL, spare parts, and etc. These products are needed to sustain the military
force involved in the battle.
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3. Technology Constraints
The technology constraints limit the capability of the U.S. to:
• predict and detect the enemy actions,
• surgically apply military power against the enemy,
• manage information on the battlefield, and
• reduce its vulnerability against the application of military power by the
adversary.
The U.S. technology is the best in the world and provides the nation with many
advantages in combat situations over its adversaries.
4. Diplomatic Constraints
The United States is involved in numerous international agreements and
treaties. These agreements and treaties have influence on the U.S.'s execution of
warfare. The U.S. must consider the impact of its military and diplomatic actions on
its other diplomatic agreements. The actions of the U.S. in the Middle East are
influenced immensely by the diplomatic relations with countries outside the Middle
East region. Acts of aggression by the U.S. against a substantially inferior country
may be looked upon unfavorably by the members of NATO or United Nations,
therefore causing an escalation of warfare or the weakening of alliances.
5. Geographical Constraints
Geographical constraints are felt in the following ways:
• The vast improvements jn weapon range and delivery means have created a
global situation where space and time provides very little security.
• Depending upon the location of the combat action, the lines of communications
may or may not be difficult to maintain.
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Geographical constraints places complication on the execution of warfare. Long lines
of communications has an adverse effect on command's ability to sustain itself.
6. Military Power Constraints
Military power has limits which the decision maker must consider in the
employment of the military force. Human preparedness, perception, and stamina;
equipment's technical and operational capabilities; weapon's lethality, delivery, and
range; control, feedback, and intelligence gathering capabilities; and the sustainability
of the war fighting effort provide the factors which provides and limits military power.
These factors must be timed and synchronized to impose maximum impact on the
enemy's will and capability to fight.
C. THE COMMANDER'S PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
The commander makes many decisions in the preparation of the battlefield which
impact the command's mission accomplishment. The preparation of the battlefield
involves the development of campaign and/or tactical plans and operation orders. The
preparation of the battlefield occurs to a certain degree at all levels of the command.
The higher levels of the command may provide for a formalized process, but within
the scope of each commander's responsibilities a like process occurs. The process
includes the mission identification, intelligence assessments, estimates, decisions, plan,
and execution.
The commander has the following options available for reaching decisions:
• Commander makes decision and announces it.
• Commander presents decision and invites questions.
• Commander presents problem, gets suggestions, makes decision.
147
• Commander defines limits, asks group to make decision.
• Commander permits subordinates to function within limits defined by superior.
[Ref 68, p. 42]
The determination of the decision making process used by the commander is based on
his leadership style. A commander's leadership style may be autocratic, democratic,
or a combination of the autocratic and democratic. The processes are listed in the
order of how autocratic they are. The "Commander permitting subordinates to function
within limits defined by superior" is considered a democratic style. [Ref. 68, pp. 37-
42]
First, the commander must become intimately familiar with his operational
environment. There is a molding process which occurs at this time. The NCA and
combatant commander organize and indoctrinate the military force to the operational
environment. During the molding process, the combatant commander is very concerned
that the military force is able to operate at its optimum combat effectiveness and
maintain a combat edge in the designated operational environment. The morale of the
military force suffers when casualties and losses are incurred while under warfare
conditions where the operational environment restricts the utilizations of its combat
power. If the combat edge is loss or judged unobtainable due to the constraints of the
operational environment, then the NCA and the commander must make a decision
whether to change the operational environment, withdraw from the environment, or
sacrifice the military force for the accomplishment of strategic objectives. The
combatant commander and NCA have a responsibility to modify, maintain, or change
the operational environment to the advantage of the U.S. military force.
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Within the confines of the operational environment, as molded, the combatant
commander along with the NCA (includes the JCS as a staff proponency) formulate the
strategic plan for the execution of the war.
Within the confines of the strategic plan and doctrine, the combatant commanders
formulate the campaign plan which "provides for a series of related military operations
to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given space and time." [Ref. 69,
p. 6-2]
Within the confines of the campaign plan and doctrine, the tactical plan is
formulated which "covers a single operation or a series of connected operations to be
carried out simultaneously or in succession." [Ref. 69, p. 6-2]
Depending upon the operational environment, the battlefield under the plan is
bounded by the area of interest and area of influence. The area of interest and
influence varies in accordance with the battlefield mobility and weapon's lethality,
delivery system, and range of friendly and opposing forces. Staff Officers' Handbook
provides the following definitions:
• The area of influence is the area which normally contains enemy forces whose
actions affect the Unit's close battle, and it is also the area wherein a
commander is capable of acquiring and fighting enemy units with assets
organic to or in support of his command. [Ref. 70, p. 3-8]
• The area of interest includes territory which contains enemy forces capable of
affecting future operations. [Ref. 70, p. 3-8]
The commander must include both of these areas when he prepares the battlefield.
The U.S. has reached the day and age where a combatant commander's area of
influence is actually global. The NCA, CINCLANT, CINCSAC, and CINCPAC have
global perspective for the employment of strategic weapons.
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The authors preference is a decision making format close to the one specified in
the U.S. Army's RB 101-999, Staff Officers' Handbook . This format is closely aligned
with the decision making process where "Commander presents problem, gets
suggestions, makes decision." This represents a combination between autocratic and
democratic styles of leadership.
1. The Mission
The commander receives his mission from higher headquarters to defend,
seize, escort, or attack a certain military objective along with combat environment type
information. The combat environment information includes instructions on force
allocation and applicable specific constraints on the employment of the force. The
commander performs assessments of the mission in order to clearly define the explicit
and implicit elements of the mission under the combat environment.
During these assessments, the commander begins to formulate his predictions
and perceptions of the possible battlefield environments. He contemplates how he
intends to direct the actions of the friendly forces and directly or indirectly influence
the actions of the opposing force so that his will and intent are the outcome on the
battlefield.
The commander's will and training must be strong and unwavering. The
combatant commander is a 4-star general or flag officer with vast command experience
at almost all levels of combat. His perspective on warfare is very broad and he is
aware of the intricate details of mission accomplishment at the various levels. He
knows that his success in warfare depends immensely upon the overall success of his
air, sea, and land forces to win at the technical, tactical, campaign, and strategic levels
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during conventional warfare, the technical, tactical, and strategic levels during low
intensity conflict, and the strategic level during nuclear warfare. So, he weighs the
performance considerations and conditions for all appropriate levels when he assigns
combat missions.
He and his men are trained to go into combat knowing that the force may
and will sustain substantial casualties no matter how effectively the military force is
employed against the enemy. They live with the losses of their fellow service
members as the fate of employing military art and a consequence of decisions reached
through the lawful process set forth in the Constitution for the employment of military
force to obtain the national security objectives. As painful as war is to the
commanders, they cannot afford to show it to their men for it may destroy their morale
and mental toughness.
Now, he contemplates the battlefield for combat. The commander's will
involves a mental simulation of the battlefields which includes the capabilities and
limitations on the employment of U.S. forces from the technical to the strategic level.
When he considers the capabilities and limitations of the military force, the commander
weighs his combat power against the combat power of the opposing force; and
identifies those actions which are necessary in combat for his force to obtain an
advantage in these situations. These actions include the application of the Principles
of War, doctrine, and strategy along with tenacity, synchronization, sheer force, and
execution. Nothing can be taken for granted in combat. During this simulation, the
Commander explores mentally what he feels will work for the command and comes
up with his perceived, feasible alternative courses of action.
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He discusses the mission with his staff and subordinate commanders to gain
further understanding of the scope and definition of the alternative courses of action.
The mission recognition phase of the process goes on throughout the operational
performance. At some point, he passes a tasking to the staff for the development of
plans and analysis of the alternative courses of action.
2. Intelligence
JCS Pub 1 defines intelligence as "the product resulting from the collection,
processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information
concerning foreign countries or areas." [Ref. 5, p. 189] Intelligence is vital to the
preparation of the battlefield. The commander must know his battlefield. There are
elements on the battlefield which are uncontrollable such as weather. There are some
elements on the battlefield that are semi-fixed such as terrain. There is the enemy,
the commander's combat opposition. JCS Pub 1 provides the following definitions on
types of intelligence:
• basic intelligence - Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation,
resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which
may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level
and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject. [Ref. 5,
p. 48]
• combat intelligence - That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical
features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat
operations. [Ref. 5, p. 74]
• current intelligence - Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest
which is usually disseminated without the delays necessary to complete
evaluation or interpretation. [Ref. 5, p. 98J
• scientific and technical intelligence - The product resulting from the collection,
evaluation, analysis, and technical information which covers: a. foreign
developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering
techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and
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limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and
materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production
methods employed for their manufacture. [Ref. 5, p. 322J
• security intelligence - Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions
of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in
espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. [Ref. 5, p. 328]
• strategic intelligence - Intelligence that is required for the formation of policy
and military plans at national and international levels. [Ref. 5, p. 349]
• tactical intelligence - Intelligence which is required for the planning and
conduct of tactical operations. [Ref. 5, p. 362]
• target intelligence - Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of
a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative
importance. [Ref. 5, p. 365]
These types of intelligence are important to the commander's evaluation of his
liabilities in the combat environment. The liabilities of the commander are found in
the area of interest and influence. The commander must stay inform of the opposing
force's intent in order to deny or disrupt the opponent commander's execution of his
will in combat.
The commander sets the intelligence requirements for the battlefield. During
the JSPS process, the commander requested the EEI, but now, he is looking for
specific information on the combat environment that he faces.
The means of intelligence gathering are categorized as human or electronic.
There are numerous systems falling under each. The satellites, air platforms, and
Over-the-Horizon Radars are examples of electronic means that provide intelligence for
a geographical area equivalent to the range of modem weaponry. An intelligence
baseline is used for the planning from the time of conflict initiation to the very end.
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The commander, intelligence section, operations section, and chief of staff are
responsible to evolve this intelligence baseline throughout the conflict.
3. The Estimates
The estimates are prepared to give an assessment of the alternative courses
of action from the perspective of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil-
military staff. The basic assumption consistency and integration of these staff efforts
is the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. The estimates may be skipped by the
commander if he feels that he has a thorough grasp of the situation or there is an
urgent need for immediate action. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7] The estimates represent the
prediction by each staff section of the battlefield results for the alternative courses of
action in their functional area. Based on these forecasts, a comparison is performed
in order to obtain the best course of action for a particular functional area. The staff
has tough time constraints in order to complete their estimates.
The personnel estimate reviews the impact of each course of action on
personnel administration and unit manpower strengths. In some cases the personnel
levels may drop below an acceptable limit for the long-term sustainment of operations.
[Ref. 65, p. 2-7]
The intelligence estimate is an evaluation of the opposing force, weather,
terrain, and other factors in "the area of operations" impact on each course of action.
The intelligence estimate looks at the intent and will of the opposing force and projects
his disposition, action, and probable reactionary courses of action during the period of
interest. The intelligence estimate gives the advantage and disadvantage of each course
of action and makes a recommendation on their feasibility. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]
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The operation estimate provides an estimate of the projected performance of
the command during the alternative courses of action. It takes into account the
operational along with the intelligence, logistics, personnel, and civil-military factors.
The recommendation states which course of action the command can perform best in
the combat environment from the operational perspective. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]
The logistic estimate looks at the logistic factors which impacts each course
of action. A military force without ammunition and equipment is handicapped. The
logistic estimate provides the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative from the
logistic perspective. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]
The civil-military operations (CMO) estimate is described as follows:
An analysis of the influence of CMO factors on accomplishment of the mission.
The CMO estimate draws conclusions and makes recommendations concerning
the feasibility of various courses of action from the perspective of the G5, and
the effects of each course of action on CMO. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]
The target output of these estimates represents information that the
commander needs and wants to know about the current and future battlefield for his
decisions. The staff presents the best information and projections at the designated
time of the decision brief. The best information and projections may have shortfalls.
These shortfalls are characterized as bad or inaccurate information and projections.
4. Decisions
Based on the staff estimates and his perception of the battlefield, the
commander provides his own estimate of the situation. Prior to announcing his
decisions, the commander addresses the pertinent factors under each course of action.
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In the commander's estimate, the decision is made between the alternative courses of
action.
Also, the commander gives his concept of the operation to the staff. In the
concept the commander provides his intent and will for the operation which sets the
tone for the planning and execution of the operation.
5. Plan
Planning is the process of "determining what is to be done, how it is to be
done, where it is to be done, who is responsible for doing it or seeing that it is done,
and when it is to be done." [Ref. 68, p. 94]
The plan stage involves the setting of tactical and/or campaign plans and
the creation of operation orders. Staff Officers' Handbook cites the following
differences between plans and orders:
• Orders are based on facts, while plans are based on assumptions that are
included in the plans.
• The time for execution of an order is known and specified, while the time of
a specified occurrence or contingency will dictate the execution of a plan.
[Ref. 65, p. 4-2]
The plan or order provides instruction on the mission, resource allocation and
organization, taskings, control, coordination, and additional information for the
subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission. The plan or order captures the
will and intent of the commander during the operation or campaign.
6. Execution
The fulfillment of the commander's will and intent during the battle is the
essence of execution. The commander must implant his will and intent into the mind
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and soul of the military force. Still, the execution on the battlefield may or may not
develop as the higher commander had mentally projected. If the course of things on
the battlefield progress adversely, the leader at the execution level can make the
necessary adjustments during the course of battle in accordance with the higher
commander's intent and will or request assistance from higher headquarters or adjacent
commands when he lacks the capability to correct adverse situation within his own
means. Assistance from higher or adjacent commands may be provided through fire
support, air support, reinforcement by reserve units and replacement personnel, or other
means. The execution must be decentralized and very flexible.
A frequently overlooked part of execution is the reporting of battlefield
information in accordance with guidance from higher headquarters. The higher
headquarters have valid information needs which can only be met by the subordinate
units. By the same token, the subordinate units have valid information needs which
only the higher headquarter can provide.
D. THE COMMANDER'S CONTROL AND FEEDBACK LOOP
The expected extensiveness of the activities within the areas of influence and
interest forces the commander to use an extensive information system consisting of his
staff, communication, and automation systems. During the operational performance, the
information system is crucial to effective C2 because it provides the means for the
commander to exercise control, and gain important feedback information. The
exercising of control is interpreted as the processes of coordinating, directing, and
controlling. These processes are defined as follows:
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• Coordinating -- "integrating all details necessary for the accomplishment of the
mission."
• Directing — "the vital step between preparation and actual operation involving
the issuance of orders and instructions to subordinates and others to indicate
what is to be done."
• Controlling - "establishing and applying fully the necessary means to ensure
that plans, orders, and policies are complied with in such a manner that the
objective will be attained." [Ref. 68, p. 94]
The information system consists of the information gathering, processing, storing,
filtering, analysis, evaluation, and/or transfer by the staff, automation, and
communication systems within the command post and between the command post and
adjacent, higher, or subordinate elements.
Within the commander's area of influence and interest, he needs to immediately
and constantly have available the following:
Military' code of ethics throughout the command.
Secure and reliable communications with friendly forces.
The ability to detect and predict the hostile actions of the opposing force.
The capability to engage the enemy with weapon payload at a farther distance
and with greater accuracy than the enemy.
A reliable assessment of the damage inflicted.
Accurate intelligence and friendly force information.
A decision making cycle shorter and more effective than his adversary.
The information system aids the commander to reduce uncertainty on the battlefield.
Whereas the commander is knowledgeable of the friendly and opposing force, the
commander faces much uncertainty on the battlefield caused by the unpredictable
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impact of the operational environment on the friendly and opposing forces and the
human factor in C2 and execution by the opposing and friendly forces.
The qualitative information generated by the information system for the
commander improves his decision making. The information system aids the
commander and his staff during the mission accomplishment and is actively used
during the preparation of the battlefield at all levels of the command. Without the
information system, the commander and staff are unable to make preparation of the
battlefield with an acceptable level of certainty and confidence in the probability of
mission accomplishment. Sometimes, the commander may have all the information in
the world, but it may not capture the battlefield situation, due to the timeliness,
accuracy, or format of presentation. The information system aids in the presentation
of the information to the Commander in an accurate and concise form.
1. U.S. Military Code of Ethics
The commander must ensure that the U.S. military code of ethics is in place
within his command. Half of his problems are over if throughout the chain of
command the military personnel are complying with the U.S. military code of ethics.
The military code of justice teaches duty, honor, and country. The entire military force
is expected to individually know their duty, perform it with honor, and place country
before self. This means that lawful orders and directives are obeyed. Unlawful orders
and directives are not obeyed and are reported, appropriately. A certain amount of
expertise is expected from the military personnel. The information being passed
throughout the command is accurate to the best of the originators knowledge.
Therefore, a basic premise for operations may be assumed that each person is
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performing their assigned missions to the best of their ability and if he is not then the
system is geared to identify sub standard performance and correct it. The U.S. military
code of ethics is very important for control purposes.
2. The Staff
The staff is the oldest externalized element of the information system. The
staff for operational performance is functionally divided into operations,
intelligence/electronic warfare, administration, logistics, and civil -military sections.
Each section serves as the commander's expertise and information system for their
respective area.
The staff is working during the operational performance to:
1. Facilitate and monitor the accomplishment of command decisions.
2. Provide timely and accurate information to the commander and
subordinate units.
3. Anticipate requirements and provide estimates of the situation.
4. Determine courses of action and recommend a course of action which
will best accomplish the mission.
5. Prepare plans and orders. [Ref. 69, p. 1-4,5]
The staff plays a substantial role in C2 at the operational performance level of the
Williams Model.
The staff at higher headquarters is typically divided between those elements
of each staff section who are performing current operations, planning, and the combat
service support functions. Each grouping of the staff along the above lines has
different operational perspective and requirements, but their efforts need orchestration
internally and externally as a unit. Today's plans are tomorrow's current operations
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and today's resources under direct control of and acquisition by the combat service
support elements are tomorrow's tools for battle. [Ref. 70, pp. 4-1 to 4-16]
3. The Communication System
The communication system facilitates the commander and his staffs ability
to plan, control, and coordinate the modem battlefield which is broadly dispersed. The
communication system allows the commander and his staff to receive and pass
information internally and externally. Information is passed externally to the various
locations of subordinate commanders, adjacent commanders, and higher headquarters
and their staff. Information is passed internally between the staff sections and
groupings. At each level of command, the commander has a tailored communication
system to provide nets in support of the command/operations, administrative/logistics,
fire support, air defense, and intelligence functions in the command. These nets
require the capability to pass data and voice traffic.
The communication system includes personnel and equipment which are
dedicated to the commander's communication needs. With the increased pace of low
intensity conflict and conventional warfare and improved mobility of the military force,
the communication personnel face the interesting challenge of employing the
communication equipment in a manner that meets the required reliability, survivability,
connectivity, redundancy, circuit allocation and quality, mobility, and security for the
communication systems that match the battlefield dynamics. [Ref. 70, p. 4-17] The
elements of communications personnel are responsible for planning, engineering,
installing, operating, and maintaining the communication system in a real-time mode.
The engineering is normally limited to black box and link engineering in the real-time
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mode. The aggregate total of communication personnel and equipment on the
battlefield is extremely large. [Ref. 70, p. 4-16 and 4-17] A substantial amount of the
end-user communication equipment is operated and maintained by the user.
There are a limited number of communication pipes on the battlefield. The
operations section of the staff prioritize the allocation of communication pipes. The
communication personnel on the staff works closely with the operation section to
ensure that the allocations do not exceed communication resource capacity. Excessive
communication traffic as well as requirements and bad placements of communication
gear are poor operations security (OPSEC). Effective management of the radio
spectrum is paramount to effective C2. The primary means of managing the radio
spectrum is through a frequency allocation document, known as the Communications
Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI). The frequencies allocated to units in the
CEOI are deconflicted. Still, there are problems if the command does not exercise
good communication discipline during operational performance.
The old communication rule within the Army provided that higher
headquarters provided communications to lower headquarters and adjacent commands
provided communications from left to right. In the joint and combined warfare arena,
there are special problems because the orderliness of the all Army scenario is
ineffective for modem warfare. At the tactical level, the Air Force is frequently an
adjacent command to the Army from the Battalion level upward. The combatant
commander fights joint wars. Therefore, the Army must talk to the Navy, Air Force,
and Marines. Due to the range, destructiveness, and accuracy of weaponry, each
service through their operations/maneuver, fire support, and air defense elements is
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able to project possibly decisive power to aid the other service in an engagement
within their traditional combat environment. Because the other services can provide
combat power in another services traditional battlefield area, there are valid information
requirements for receiving and passing information on a timely basis between the
services. The traditional way to solve this problem was to provide a liaison officers)
with his own communication capability to coordinate support.
The separate communication system is intolerable, complicates frequency
management, and contributes to different battlefield perceptions. The Army has its
information system and the Air Force, Marines, and Navy have their own. The land,
air, and sea forces need an accurate and timely picture of the situation at sea, on land,
and in the air to fulfill their mission. The communication system for the military
force should be integrated and compatible so that the information may be passed as
required automatically around the battlefield. The ground commander in need of
munition should learn that his munition supply ship was sunk by the opposing force
as soon as possible so that the impact may be assessed and appropriate measures
adopted to minimize the adverse affect.
There is a part of the communication system dedicated to electronic warfare.
This equipment falls under the intelligence personnel who use the equipment to gather
intel information on the disposition of the opposing force.
4. The Automation System
The automation system facilitates the control, coordination, and planning
process on the modern battlefield. Many redundant procedures manually performed by
the staff and the instruments of the commander during previous wars have succumbed
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to automation. The automation of these procedure facilitates the rapid and timely flow
of information on the battlefield. Through the automation of key redundant procedures,
the staff's performance has been enhanced tremendously.
The use of manual map overlay displays for the information presentation is
slowly being replaced by wide screen digitized displays that provide a more accurate
topographical display. These displays are very flexible and permit the projection of
trends and previous point of time information as well as current battlefield situation.
The storage, processing, and filtering of information were through a
cumbersome manual process, but the processes are being replaced by an automated
system(s) which provides prompt, reliable, and accurate information retrieval. The JRS
and other documents spelled out the information requirements of the NCA and
commanders. The automated systems facilitate the processing of this information by
permitting the interactive input of information. Also, the system permits automatic
display of essential information concerning friendly and opposing forces on the
topographical display. The automated storage and processing are permitting the single
manual entry of information into the information system and the automatic transfer of
updates to higher and adjacent headquarters.
Briefing charts and slides were manually generated by graphics personnel
which was very slow and inflexible, but now the automated graphic packages are
permitting the staff action officers to do their own in a timely and flexible manner.
The staff officers are able to portray with greater accuracy the current battlefield
situation.
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By combining the satellite communications technology and automation
capability, the following improvements were made:
• Manual system of map reading for determining position was replaced by an
automated system with unbelievable accuracy.
• The delivery, accuracy, and range of many weapon system were enhanced.
• The detection, tracking, sensory, warning, and projection of threatening forces
increased immensely.
Automation is a key element of the distributed C2 system such as World
Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) that is serving the
commanders at all levels. "The primary mission of WWMCCS is to support the
national-level command and control function." [Ref. 52, p. 117] WWMCCS consists
of the following elements:
• Warning Systems are the tactical warning systems that notify operation
command centers of the occurrence of a threatening event.
• WWMCCS Communications include the general- and special-purpose
communications capabilities to convey information, hold conferences, and issue
orders.
• Data Collection and Processing is the collection and handling of data to
support information requirements of WWMCCS.
• Executive Aids are the WWMCCS -related documents, procedures, reporting
structure, and system interaction that permit the user to connect with the
system, enter data, and receive output records, forms, and displays.
• WWMCCS Command Facilities are the primary or alternate command centers.
[Ref. 52, p. 117]
The various C2 systems are aids to the commander's decision making process.
There are many other improvements being provided to the C2 process by
automation system. There are many future improvements projected for C2.
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5. The Leadership Ability of the Commander
The commander has overall authority and responsibility for the
accomplishment of assigned missions within his area of influence and interest. He
may delegate authority, responsibility, and accountability for designated missions, but
the delegation does not relieve his accountability. As the Commander, he has
responsibility to effectively employ the assigned forces in the operational environment.
His success in this endeavor is dependent on his leadership. In the book, Taking
Command: The Art and Science of Military Leadership , Colonel Samuel H. Hays and
Lieutenant Colonel William N. Thomas define leadership as "the art of influencing
human behavior so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader."
Ref. 68, p. 16] The commander may decentralize execution and decision-making but
he must ensure that all personnel in his command have accountability for their actions.
The military units must fight as a team and it is his responsibility to plan, organize,
coordinate, control, monitor, and direct the activity in his command to ensure that the
fight is well orchestrated. [Ref. 68]
E. THE EVOLVEMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
During combat the other six levels of the Williams Model do not go away. They
are very active and working to evolve the operational environment, so that, it is more
favorable to the U.S. The military chain of command can not afford to ignore these
levels. The Acquisition System may produce new military force capabilities which
may change the tide of the war. The American people may elect a new President who
is violently opposed to the war. The combat readiness level will continue to train
and sustain the military force. The national security interests, objective, policy, and
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strategy may be redefined and thereby cause change to the military objective, policy,
and strategy as well as the military force organization.
167
IX. THE CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Effective C2 over the military role in "common defence" is vital to the nation's
ability to face the challenges to its existence. The Williams Model provides a clear
portrayal of C2 over the military role in "common defence." (See Figure 15) There
is a hierarchical flow of C2 from the American people to the fighting force. The
author documents this hierarchical flow.
The American people via the expression of their will, values, sense of heritage,
and economic strength are the foundation and ultimate source of C2 over the military
role in "common defence." The Constitution of the United States is the second level
of C2. The Constitution delineates the federal system which delegates power and
authority between the national and state government and divides the power of the
national government between the branches. Using the power received, the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the federal government plan, direct, organize,
coordinate, and control the utilization of the "common defence" elements for obtaining
the objective of "common defence" and providing opportunity for the other objectives
for governance. The national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy are the
bases for prioritizing the expenditure of resources, setting the military force structure,
and determining the required readiness of the military forces. The force organization
provides the institutionalize systems and force organizations that set the personnel and
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Figure 15. The Williams Model for C2
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so that national security interests are protected, national security objectives are
accomplished, and national security policy is followed. Within the force organization,
the military objectives, policy, and strategy are formulated. Combat readiness is the
process of training, maintaining, and strengthening the force as an instrument for
deterrence and a capable fighting force. The operational performance is the
orchestrated employment of the military force for "common defence" in combat. There
is a chain of command from the National Command Authority to the lowest technical
level during the operational performance.
B. THE CONCLUSION
C2 over the military role in "common defence" is crucial to the obtainment of
the objective assigned to the national government, "to provide for the common
defence." The author gives a realistic approach to understanding and enhancing the
effectiveness of C2.
The main theme is that C2 over the military role in "common defence" occurs
in war as well as in peace, and therefore, it is safe to say that C2 is a historical as
well as current process that starts with the will, values, and heritage of the American
people. The levels of C2, functioning outside the realm of operational performance
level, but exercising control, are just as important as the performance during operations.
Whenever the U.S. goes to war or has a conflict the success of the military force is
influenced and directed tremendously by its operational environment. The decisions
being made today will determine the capabilities and limitations of the military force
in combat today as well as for the future. A commander cannot direct the shooting
of weapons he does not have. The commander cannot direct the destruction of a
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moving target outside the confines of his detection capabilities and weapons delivery,
range, and accuracy capability. The commander's range of activities, options and
predicted outcomes are predetermined before combat. These predetermined ranges are
an exercise of C2 and determines the operational environment. Everything that the
commander can do, does or cannot do is predicated on the operational environment
which is created by the other six levels of C2.
A secondary theme is that every American citizen has a responsibility in
providing for "common defence." The will and values of the American people are
present in silent and active forms. The silent form is captured in the Constitution and
the processes such as elections, constitutional amendment, and the legislation, execution,
and judication of the law by duly elected or appointed officials. In its active form, the
will and values of the American people are expressed through protest, strikes, and other
means. The government personnel must deal with the active and silent forms.
The NCA must interpret, influence, and direct the will of the American people
for C2 as well as influence, direct, and control the activities of the military force. The
mature development of all the levels is paramount to effective C2, however one level
may dominate during a period of history.
The information system is common to all levels and elements of the C2 system.
The performance of the decision makers are dependent upon the quality of the
information system. The information system consists of the staff, communications, and
automation systems used for the gathering, processing, storing, filtering, analysis,
evaluation, and/or transfer of information in support of a valid information requirement.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are submitted:
• The perception of C2 by the American people and the military should be
expanded to include the realm of decision making activities which determine
the operational environment. An understanding of the operational environment
and knowledge on how to determine if the operational environment is
changeable are crucial to successful operational performance.
• Continued research should be undertaken on the C2 functioning of each level
in the Williams Model for C2. Research is needed on the C2 functioning of
each level to precisely identify, define, and measure their attributes in the C2
perspective.
• The information system design, architecture, concept of operation, and etc.
should be developed for every level in the force organization. Each level of
the C2 hierarchy is dependent upon the quality of information received.
Without quality information, the decision makers at a level cannot make sound
decisions.
• The techniques for mission analysis, intelligence, estimates, decisions, plans,
and execution during operational performance should be studied in greater
depth. The study of the decision making process will improve the staff's
ability to assist the Commander. The staff must provide information to the
commander which will result in the sound preparation of the battlefield and
maximize the friendly forces chance of success.
Effective C2 over the military role in "common defence is crucial to the obtainment
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